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INLUCETUA
In the Middle
We're a long way from what O.P. Kretzmann liked to
call the high noon of the twentieth century. Wondering
the other day what it might have felt like to be in that
middle-! was ten at the time, and not inclined to
metaphysics, so it passed me by without my noticing--gave
me pause. On so many of today's issues I seem to be in the
middle, at least as I sense the boundaries set up by the
people who write or speak nationally. In terms of
generations, I'm too late for the Silent Generation, too
early for the Baby Boomers. I'm also in that group of folks
who have children yet to provide for, and parents to worry
about. Here too I seem to be in the middle.
More than this, though, the quality of mind which
seeks a middle characterizes what is for me most
praiseworthy in human endeavor. If I had posters in my
office, the Hunk for my wall (if I were being my best self)
wouldn't be Gerard Depardieu. My choice would be Cyrus
Vance-what a guy! The achievements of the heroic
extremist pale before those of the person who can pull two
sides closer to a middle. Thus, while the world needed
Martin Luther King, Jr., it also needs Will Campbell,
understanding and ministering to the Klansman as to the
Freedom Rider.
At its worst, of course, this attitude means never
having to say you're sorry, because you've never said, done,
or thought anything that could bother anyone. Later on,
you can always point to your careful non-involvement in
any cause. You don't have to establish deniability because
you were never in a position to have anything to deny. But
at its best, the tendency may spring from and result in
strong feelings of connectedness. People on both sides of
an issue may have claims--as friends, sisters, parents--such
that one cannot dismiss them, and their unwelcome
ideology, simply. Thus dialogue becomes a necessity, and
exploration, diffidence, and humility a characteristic mode
of discourse.
Such a view may explain why, to many people, the
old-fashioned academic may seem disconnected from
"reality." Crisp decision-making rules the day. Your
bumper stickers should be congruent; one seldom sees
"Visualize World Peace" and "Support Our Troops" on the
same car. But ideally, the academic mind has this capacity
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to look around, and in some manner to see both behind
and before. To give weight to both past and future
inevitably gives a person the sense of being in the middle.
The historical view and the prophetic view converge in this:
they see the present as a contingent, not a culminating
moment.
Now that so much of our public discourse is shaped
by the metaphors of struggle and contention-the term
"culture wars" being only the most forthright-perhaps we
do well to give some effort to thinking in the middle, to the
re-establishment of the means of creating middle spaces in
our arguments. To some extent, such an activity defines
The Cresset, one of a decreasing number of journals not
devoted to one side or another of a cause, but seeking to
give space for a number of positions held by people who
desire to be engaged with what they must, at least
temporarily, call "the other side."
In this issue, two more articles developed from the
Cresset Colloquium occupy the first pages. Professor
McGuigan's article is long, and dense, but its careful
reasoning and calm deliberation merit attention even from
those of us who read philosophy only when prodded by a
sharp stick. Professor Duvick applies toliterature the
principles of communitarian discourse, providing an
elegant demonstration that learning happens best with
openness to possibility.
Other articles too describe a spectrum-not certainly
the widest one could describe, but nevertheless modestly
divergent. Still, their common element seems to me the
desire to speak- would "lovingly" be too soft and maternal
a term? Before the next Cresset appears, all of us will have
to have made many choices, and those we make on the
ballot are only the most public. My hope is that we work at
seeing our choices modestly. To continue with a spatial
metaphor, I wish that we could learn to see our choices
not so much as a defiant staking out of positions, but
rather as necessary interruptions in the process of
expanding our common ground.
Peace,

GME
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EXCELLENCE AND INCLUSION:
AN ARISTOTELIAN ARGUMENT FOR OPENING THE CANON

JoEIIen Mitchell McGuigan
As part of my participation in the Cresset
Colloquium last spring I was given the opportunity to read
and reflect on two recent works written by woman scholars:
Transforming Knowledge by Elizabeth Minnich and Love's
Knowledge by Martha Nussbaum. Though there was no
particular need to relate the work of one to the other
notwithstanding the appearance of "knowledge" in the title
of both books it struck me immediately that there was an
important point of connection between them. Minnich's
book is a critique of the Academy, one designed to
promote the inclusion of more work by women and
persons of color in the university curriculum. On the
other hand, Nussbaum's essays in Love's Knowledge present
a demonstration of what philosophy done in "a different
voice" can be like. As I read Nussbaum's unique treatment
of literature and philosophy, as I worked through her
cognitivist account of the emotions, as I read and reflected
on her insistence that Aristotelian conceptions of
rationality and the good life could be highly instructive for
us today, I could not help thinking that this was just the
sort of work Minnich was proffering for inclusion in the
canon, not because its inclusion would satisfY the demands
for political correctness, but because the work itself has the
potential for transforming our very conception of the
world, for constituting, in other words "transforming
knowledge" of the sort Minnich places at the heart of the
university's enterprise.
While Minnich sometimes made her claims
awkwardly, even abrasively, for me there was no mistaking
the importance of her fundamental point-traditional
conceptions of what counts as knowledge, of what sort of
characteristics quality a work as excellent, have been far too
limited to do justice to our students. It is this claim of
Minnich's that I want to write about here. Somewhat
ironically, I intend to do so not by laying out and analyzing

JoEllen McGuigan teaches in the VU School of Law. Her law
degree is from UCLA ( 1975) ; she is currently a candidate for the
Ph.D. from the University of Utah. Her interests in law and
philosophy combine through work in political theory. In the spring
semester of 1993, she will offer an undergraduate course in
feminist philosophy.
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her particular arguments, but by actually trying to do a bit
of philosophy on Nussbaum's Aristotelian model. In these
few pages I hope to sketch an Aristotelian conception of
distributive justice as applied to the university. In so doing,
I intend to suggest at least one justification for opening up
the curriculum to the works of women and members of
other under-represented groups, by suggesting how our
conception of excellence could be enlarged using
Aristotelian notions of human flourishing, inclusively
understood. But, before I present you with my own ideas, a
summary of Nussbaum's arguments for Aristotelian
distribution is in order.

I. Nussbaum on Aristotle on Distribution
In recent essays such as "Aristotelian Social
Democracy" and "Nature Function and Capability:
Aristotle on Political Distribution" Nussbaum has been
exploring the possibility that an Aristotelian conception of
justice might provide a real alternative to liberal principles
of distribution. This is the case because at the heart of
much of Aristotle's work on politics and society lies the
fundamental question: what is the good for human beings?
It is Nussbaum's belief that controversies over how to allot
material wealth, institutional and social opportunities, even
political power, cannot be resolved without first
confronting this basic question . Her belief stands in
contrast to the approach of political philosophers in the
liberal tradition such as Mill, or John Rawls in his 1971 A
Theory ofJustice, who approach distributive questions with a
steadfastly agnostic attitude toward the possessions, objects,
experiences, activities, and opportunities that we ought to
hold constitutive of a good human life.
At best, theorists like Rawls have only a "thin" theory
of good which validates only those "primary" goods
assumed to be desired by any person regardless of her
general conception of a life well lived. Utilitarians share
with Rawls an aversion to promoting one conception of the
good for persons over another, being generally skeptical of
an account of the good that could have determinate
content and be objectively validated. As a result they leave
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to the particular preferences of individual persons the
resolution of what is choiceworthy and what is not. Of
course there are many critical differences between Rawls'
theory and utilitarianism, the most important of which is
Rawls' deontological orientation. But in approaching
distributive questions with no articulate theory of the good,
such political theorists fall back on the principle of
maximization as at least one main device of their
distributive approach. Thus, as Nussbaum points out,
Rawls takes it to be evident that if some wealth and income
is necessary to any life, and therefore in that sense some
wealth and income constitute primary goods, it can also be
assumed that "most persons prefer a greater, rather than a
smaller share of wealth and income" (Rawls, 396).
Similarly it is the distinguishing feature of utilitarianism
most generally understood, that the maximization overall
of whatever is preferred or desired by persons is the goal of
any efficient distribution.
Aristotle's central placement of the question of what
is the good for humans stands as a challenge to the notion
that a general principle of maximization could ever be an
adequate basic approach to distributive issues. From his
perspective, it is not possible to assume that more wealth is
better than less wealth, without understanding how riches
affect human excellence and the possibility of actually
achieving a life well lived. On an Aristotelian view, external
goods, like any tool, all have a limit of instrumental use
that can only be established by reference to what such
goods are actually useful for. Without a contentful general
theory of the good, such a reference cannot be made.
Perhaps more importantly, the Aristotelian would hold that
without a rich theory of the good, there is no means by
which to distinguish merely instrumental from intrinsic
goods. Hence, distributive schemes which aim at
maximization of undifferentiated particular goods without
any theory of how they relate to a human life well-lived are
fundamentally incoherent.
Of course for the proponent of any specific vision of
the good, the problem has always been to objectively
legitimate its substantive content, to establish it as the
justified account over competing alternatives. But, the
Aristotelian has a plausible response to this problem, for
from her perspective, the good for human beings can be
articulated by reference to human nature, which in turn
yields the notion of excellent human functioning, or, full
human flourishing. From this perspective, only
possessions, objects, experiences, activities and
opportunities that actually promote full human flourishing
should be subject to distribution, and then only in the right
amounts. Hence, not every preference or desire implies a
distributive claim and the device of maximization ceases to
have any favored status in the system of allotment. We
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need not, for instance, count the desire for tobacco as
equivalent to the desire for knowledge in trying to
determine a just distribution of available social resources.
Taking her lead from Aristotle then, it is Nussbaum's
view that "the things that one cannot have too much and
more is always better than less" are "the capabilities out of
which excellent functioning, doing well and living well, can
be selected" (Nussbaum 1988, 152). Hence, the purpose
of political arrangements is and ought to be to "effect the
transition from one level of [human] capacity to another"
(146). And, thus, the best distributive scheme is the one
that best provides the persons subject to it with the
necessary conditions of their fully human flourishing.
Now it is not Nussbaum's project simply to argue for
the superiority of the Aristotelian conception of the good
over accounts that remain agnostic on the question of what
is choiceworthy for humans and take the task of good
political arrangements to be to maximize our given desires
or preferences overall, whether they be for push-pin,
daytime TV or great works of art. The intuitive appeal of
liberal conceptions of liberty make establishing the
superiority of the Aristotelian vision difficult, complex and
controversial. While Nussbaum's work has contributed
significantly to the whole debate between communitarians
and liberals, it is also a central aim of her writing to
develop the distributive implications of the Aristotelian
approach to their fullest in order to demonstrate its
potential as an inclusive democratic vision. It is this aspect
of her analysis that I want to exploit in my application of
her views to the university. But how does Nussbaum hope
to convince us that Aristotelianism has within it a rich
theory of the good that promotes just distributions and is
also inclusive? To understand this aspect of her work, it is
necessary to connect the Aristotelian understanding of the
good as excellent human functioning to notions of human
capacity and eligibility for membership in the polity.
II. Human Functioning, Human Excellence, and
Virtue.
It is the key piece in Nussbaum's argument that
attention to human nature will yield, at an acceptable level
of generality, just one determinate set of human
functionings from which correlative particular goods may
be ascertained. Of course it is just this claim that liberal
political theorists question. Nonetheless, in her view, these
are the goods that turn out to be constituents of the good
life, in that they enable us to effectuate a multiplicity of
uniquely human functionings by enabling us to develop a
diversity of capabilities correlative to those functionings. It
is this last move, from function to capacity, that contains
the democratic implications Nussbaum wants to develop
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and extend from the Aristotelian vision. But not just any
sort of activity undertaken by a human being constitutes
uniquely human functioning and so not just any capacity
possessed by humans constitutes a basis for particular
distributive claims. To hold otherwise would be to
reformulate the Aristotelian vision into a kind of liberalism
where every capacity possessed by a person-be it for drug
addiction or cruelty--would give rise to a potential
distributive claim, regardless· of whether the exercise of
that capacity promotes excellent human functioning or
not. Clearly, the Aristotelian conception of human
functioning and its relation to human capacity must be
understood before the plausibility of its power to provide
us with a contentful theory of the good can be assessed.
The classic statement of this conception is found in
Aristotle's argument connecting the good with excellent
human functioning found in Book One of the Nicomachean
Ethics.
In the beginning sections of Book One, Aristotle has
posed the question of what ends we pursue for their own
sake, and not for the sake of other ends. In response, he
identifies happiness as such an end:
Now happiness is thought to be such an end most of all, for it is
this that we choose always for its own sake and never for the sake
of something else; and as for honor and pleasure and intellect
and every virtue, we choose them for their own sake ... but we also
choose them for the sake of happiness, believing that through
these we shall be happy, but no one chooses happiness for the
sake of these, nor, in general, for the sake of some other thing.
(EN. 1097bl-6)
On these grounds, Aristotle identifies happiness with the
good, for he holds that only that which we pursue for its
own sake can constitute the good.
But, the point of the arguments in the Nicomachean
Ethics is to demonstrate the best way to live, not to establish
the foundation for an ethical philosophy grounded in
hedonism. So, it is Aristotle's task to generate content for
this notion of the good that goes beyond an identification
of happiness with that which we pursue for its own sake.
This he does by associating real happiness with excellent
human functioning:
Perhaps to say that happiness is the highest good is something
which appears to be agreed upon; what we miss, however, is a
more explicit statement as to what it is. Perhaps this might be
given if the function of a man is taken into consideration . For
just as in a flute-player or a statue-maker or any artist or, in
general, in anyone who has a function or an action to perform the
goodness or excellence lies in that function, so it would seem to
be the case in a man, if indeed he has a function . But, should we
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hold that while a carpenter and a shoemaker have certain
functions or actions to perform, a man has none at all, but is by
nature without a function? Is it not more reasonable to posit that,
just as an eye and a hand and a foot and any part of the body in
general appear to have certain functions, so a man has some
function other than these? What then should that function be?
(EN. 1097b20-33)
To warrant this move from an undifferentiate d
notion of the good as happiness to a contentful conception
of the good as human functioning, Aristotle has to
demonstrate that there is some function unique to human
beings alone. This he does by identifying the life of a
human being as " the life of action of a being who has
reason"(EN. 1098a3-5). While we share a life of nutrition
and growth with plants and also a life of perception with
animals, we are unique in the worldly scheme of things as
beings who possess the capacity to act, reflectively and
according to reason. As a result, any conception of the
good for man, of happiness for man as a species being
with unique attributes, will have to take the human capacity
to act according to reason into account, in fact will have to
give it a central position. So, following the identification of
the good with happiness, happiness in turn with human
functioning, and unique human functioning with our
capacity to act as reason dictates, Aristotle believes that he
is justified to "posit the function of a man to be a certain
kind of life, namely, activity or actions of the soul with
reason" (EN. 1098al3-14). Moreover, this does not
provide us with a minimal standard of human functioning
only, for "the function of a man is generically the same as
that of a good man, like that of a lyre player and a good
lyre player"(EN. 1098a9-10) so that "excellence with
respect to virtue" ought to be added to that function.
Hence, "the good for man turns out to be an activity of the
soul [reason] according to virtue ... " (EN. 1098al5-17) .
Hence, the "good for man" just is excellent human
functioning, where the identification of excellence with
virtue is understood.
Now Aristotle does not give the term "virtue" its
modern meaning of moral rectitude with connotations of
chasteness, virginity and the like. Rather, he wants to
explain virtue and its correlative, excellence, by reference
to action and to use it in his analysis to establish that the
best human life is the one the strives for the realization of
practical wisdom. So later in Book Two, Aristotle tells us:
[Ethical] virtue, then, is a habit, disposed toward action by
deliberate choice, being at the mean relative to us, and defined by
reason, as a prudent man would define iL It is a mean between
two vices, one by excess and the other by deficiency; and while
some of the vices exceed while the others are deficient in what is
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right in feelings and actions, virtue finds and chooses the mean.
(EN. 1106b35-1107a5)

By these various arguments, Aristotle has taken us
from the good, to happiness, to human functioning, and
then finally, to excellent human functioning as the
undertaking of our actions in accordance with practical
reason, that is, as the performing of actions deliberately
chosen in accordance with virtue, where virtue is
understood as the disposition to effect actions that
practical reason establishes as being at the mean relative to
us. But what real relevance does this theory of the good
have for political questions about how to distribute a
society's wealth and opportunity? From Nussbaum's
perspective it is simply this: on an Aristotelian model, the
good society does not just aim at increasing wealth, at
enlarging the GNP, but rather it actively promotes the
excellent human functioning, the full human flourishing,
of its members. And, this goal has rather significant
distributive implications of both a negative and a positive
sort. It serves to limit the list of goods subject to the
distribution to those things that promote or effectuate
excellent human functioning. And, with regard to these, it
requires that each individual receive only the amount that
best promotes her functioning, not necessarily the amount
she desires. Following the negative implications of a view
such as this, for example, we would not have to count the
smoker's desire for more and more cigarettes as something
that social resources ought to be devoted to satisfying. We
would have an articulate reason to justify choosing to
spend resources on things like art and education and
medical care instead.
But, perhaps an even more striking distributive effect
of Aristotle's theory of the good is that it provides rather
strong arguments for the notion of positive entitlements to
societal resources like education, health care and more. If
the good for human beings just is excellent human
functioning, and if the good society just is one that takes as
its prime purpose the promotion of that sort of functioning
in its members, then the good society has a positive
obligation, within the limits of its resources, to provide
them with the things that they need to flourish-from basic
goods such as food and shelter, to more complex resources
like a fine education, sports and artistic experiences,
appropriate contexts within which to raise children, outlets
for sexuality and other forms of personal expression,
opportunities to politically participate, chances to meet
others and to communicate with them in friendship,
outlets for spirituality, chances to enjoy beauty,
opportunities to develop a special skill, trade or hobby and
the like. All of these things would qualify as goods to be
distributed, because they are all important in some way to
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make full human functioning possible and each relates in
some sense to various human capacities. Following an
Aristotelian conception like this, a society that wished to be
counted as good would not leave the development of the
functioning of its members to the exigencies of the market
and one's possibility of fully flourishing would not depend
on the accidents of one's birth.
Now,
while
the
AristoteEan conception generates a rather impressive list of
positive entitlements, some argue that it tells us nothing
about who is to qualify as a recipient of such a distribution.
It has been an effective liberal critique of the Aristotelian
political vision that Aristotle himself promoted the
superiority of an aristocracy, denigrated women, justified
slavery and excluded common working people from
political participation, among other things. Nonetheless,
Nussbaum asserts that contained within the broader
distributive implications of Aristotle's approach to the
good is an argument for an inclusive, a democratic, vision
of the proper way to allot society's resources. Nussbaum
takes it as part of her project to reconstruct Aristotle and by
so doing, to liberate the Aristotelian vision from its
aristocratic, anti-democratic past.
III. Capacity, Practical Reason, and Inclusion
From an analysis of various clues in the text, even
including attention to Aristotle's infamous treatment of
women and slaves, Nussbaum concludes that the necessary
and sufficient condition for qualifying as a recipient of a
just distribution is possessing by one's very nature a less
developed capability, a basic capacity, to eventually
perform the particular actions required by the context of
one's life in accordance with practical reason. The core
notion here is that the dictates of practical reason,
determined by reference to an embedded potential life
history, generate a number of human functions, of
potential human excellences that can be related back to
basic capabilities that give rise to their possible actual
exercise when nurtured by appropriate education and
other resources. This general criterion can be reduced to
the notion that persons who possess, by their nature, a
minimum practical rational capacity that could be
developed by the receipt of social resources like education
are entitled to be included in the distribution.
Now members of groups that have been excluded
from political participation and stinted in societal
distributive schemes are understandably wary of an
approach to eligibility for full membership in the polity
based on one's capacity for rationality. After all, it was just
this criterion that Aristotle believed women and slaves
could not satisfy by their very nature. Some hold that the
notion of rationality itself is so ambiguous, so flexible, that
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it can be manipulated easily to provide a seemingly neutral
basis for excluding certain human beings subject to a
political system that affects and controls them from any
claim to participation in it. This is a serious problem and
one that cannot be easily resolved. Much of Nussbaum's
work on distributive justice, however, consists in suggesting
how this challenge might be met within a general
Aristotelian framework by using the broad strategy of
logically extending and developing the implications of
fundamental Aristotelian notions con sis ten tly. From
Nussbaum's perspective, Aristotle himself failed to
consistently analyze the requirements of his own basic
doctrines when he wrote about women, slaves and laborers.
Where might we go then in Aristotle's work to obtain
a more specific understanding of the general requirement
of the capacity to become practically wise? How can we
understand how to tailor this basic notion to the
circumstances of particular lives, lived in specific context by
persons who have individual, but undeveloped, latent
talents that might be relevant to a multiplicity of special
human functionings performed in myriad circumstances?
How can we in turn transform what we find into modern
arguments for inclusion within an Aristotelian framework?
In my view the richest source in Aristotle's own work is the
practica~ the context sensitive, aspect of practical reason.
Aristotle's basic notion of practical reason suffers
from a certain ambiguity that we can see replicated in
Nussbaum's analysis of the correlative concepts of human
functioning and human capacity. This is the case because
practical reason possesses some attributes that are very
difficult to understand, stemming from its functional
nature. While Aristotle sometimes talks as though the
person who is practically wise possesses a general abstract
property that exhibits the quintessential human attribute, it
is also quite clear from the manner in which he works out
the details of his theory that the notion of practical wisdom
can only receive its determinate content in use, when
practical reason is being exercised to dictate virtuous
action in particular circumstances. Understood in this way,
the notion of practical reason has a kind of modal quality
to it, for it captures the notion of the possibility of choosing
to behave in a certain manner in a future context. To be
practically wise just is to act in response to specific
conditions as the prudent person would, that is, to
conform one's conduct to generate only those actions that
are "at the mean, relative to us" in our particular
circumstance. To think of practical reason in its potential
state, then, is to think of it as a general disposition to act in
such a way on particular occasions. To think of it in its
actual state is to conceive of it in terms of actual choices
made, of determinate performed actions undertaken in
context, all of which exhibit behavior stemming from one's
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general disposition, from one's general capacity to be
practically wise, but each of which displays conduct at the
mean, relative to the actor in her particular circumstance.
As a result, practical reason is constituted both by a
general disposition and a series of actual deeds undertaken
by particular persons in response to requirements for
action stemming from real life. It is not surprising then,
that we can become confused over whether practical
reason refers to one general human functioning, or many,
whether it is foreshadowed by one general human capacity,
or many particular capabilities that might be activated in
the circumstances of individual cases. This is important to
efforts both to understand and extend the implications of
Aristotle's views, because the more and varied the functions
and capabilities that the notion of practical reason
supports, the more and diverse are the persons who can
stake their claim to inclusion in the distribution. In my
view, a correct analysis of practical reason combines both
its general and particular aspects, both its potential and
actual manifestations, but places the greatest emphasis on
its context sensitive character. To analyze it otherwise is
simply to denigrate its practical character. Practical reason
is that which enables us to live well by enabling us to
choose to act, when required by the exigencies of our
situation, in a manner that conforms to the dictates of
virtue in the actual circumstance presented. As such, it
allows, even presupposes, reference to diverse human
contexts, to diverse correlative capabilities and, most
importantly, to diverse human actions and actors in the
determination of who is entitled to be included in a just
distribution of any policy's material wealth and social
opportunities.
To put my argument in another way, the contexts of
practical reason range over all human endeavors with
social value, including those previously undertaken just by
women, or slaves or laborers. Moreover, the association of
excellence with practical reason, and practical reason in
turn with the myriad contexts of human life as it is actually
lived, counts against an elitist, exclusionist understanding
of that term. A person is excellent, a work is excellent, an
institution is excellent in Aristotelian terms insofar as each
reflects the unique human capacity for acting in
accordance with practical reason in the context at hand.
In attempting to amass knowledge, to understand our
human predicament, to forge a society that works, we
cannot treat some contexts that are obviously essential to
human life as though they are meaningless, simply because
they have been the circumstances to which the less
powerful in our society have been consigned. Nor can we
afford to view the practical wisdom, the knowledge gained
in those settings, as somehow not excellent because it is
possessed by those who have not been included in the past.
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The Aristotelian conception of practical reason has no
determinable content, in fact is powerless to supply us with
a rich theory of the good, unless we are willing to recognize
that by its very nature it requires diversity for its meaning.
If we recognize the essential importance of diversity for our
rich theory of the good, the distributive implications of our
theory must be inclusively understood as well.
In developing his specific ideas about the virtues of
character, in attempting to show the significance of
practical reason in various contexts, Aristotle described
many human endeavors and activities that he obviously
valued and in regard to which he believed humans could
function excellently and attain practical wisdom. He talked
about the lyre player and the general, the ship's captain
and the carpenter. In addition, he should have talked
about the wife tending her child or cooking food, about
the slave tending her master, about the laborer planting
the fields, for each provides a context of unique human
endeavor of human function that can be done well or ill,
that can be performed through actions chosen in
accordance with reason or not. As such, each provides a
circumstance in which the unique human capacity to be
practically wise is essential and can yield knowledge
valuable for all. Unless we are willing to hold with Aristotle
that women and persons of color and common laborers are
indeed different sorts of beings altogether, unless we are
willing to agree that they have a different species-being
that does not allow for their capacity to be practically wise,
we cannot exclude them from full participation in the
distribution of a just society.
IV. Distribution and the University

As I mentioned at the beginning of this piece, it was
my intention to apply the distributive implications of
Nussbaum's recent work to the university in general, in
order to make an argument for the inclusion of scholarly
work by women, persons of color, and members of other
under-represented groups in the canon. Many claims have
been made for such inclusion based on intuitive notions of
fairness. Mine has a different focus and consists basically in
this point: if the university can be thought to embody a
thick theory of the good on an Aristotelian model, then
consistency requires that it be committed to diversity in the
allocation of all the resources that it represents. The canon
is one such resource subject to apportionment, and so it
should contain the excellent works of members of the
polity generated from all socially useful contexts. What
follows is a brief sketch of the argument supporting these
claims. I begin my analysis with a number of explicit
assumptions.
The first is that access to education in general and to
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a university education of a particular kind is a societal
resource subject to distributive claims. While for the
purposes of my argument, the university should be thought
of as a resource, it should also be conceived of as a society
within a society, charged with making distributions within
its own sphere and subject to scrutiny on the question of
whether those distributions are just and consistent with its
mission, again understood on an Aristotelian model.
The second is that there is an abundance of excellent
scholarly work by women, persons of color and others from
under-represented groups that could be included within
the curriculum. I take it as simply not plausible, as false,
that the reason for the absence of such work is its nonexistence or its lack of merit. This is especially the case
when one gives excellence its particularly Aristotelian twist
and associates it with the core notion of practical reason. I
invite anyone who questions these claims to actually survey
the work that is available, that has been available for a very
long time and that is being generated currently in order to
make an independent evaluation. In making this
evaluation, I would urge the reader to also consider that
this work carries with it additional value, because it
represents practical wisdom generated from contexts that
we do not know enough about.
Finally, I take it as non-controversial that the students
attending the university will continue to come from more
and more diverse backgrounds, from more and different
racial, ethnic, cultural, religious, geographic and class
contexts and that the high enrollment of women, especially
at the undergraduate level, will continue. Moreover, I take
it that these phenomena are positive, and that such
students represent a particularly various set of human
capacities and potentially excellent human functions that
need to be developed.
One of the most important aspects of my argument is
constituted by the claim that on an Aristotelian model,
education is perhaps the critical social resource subject to
distribution. This is true because of the connection
between nascent human capacities and excellent human
functionings. While it is very difficult to develop one's
capacities, one's talents, without basic goods such as food
and shelter, education is that resource which most brings
out the unique human facility for reason, as it is to be
applied practically in various contexts, so that full human
flourishing is possible. It is an obvious subtext of Aristotle's
work that providing education to human beings, so that
they may learn how to live well, is perhaps the most
important task of the good society.
The university's role in this general endeavor is quite
obvious. While some might hold that the university is to be
removed from the general society to provide a place of
peace and quiet contemplation for the development of
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abstract knowledge, of, as Aristotle calls it theoria, closer
attention to his arguments will reveal that it is also to be a
repository of practical wisdom, of phromsis. This is true in
part because the university is to be an integrated
component of the whole society, and as such, actively
involved in realizing its general goals. And, the very
projects that provide the subject matter for study are those
that arise from the context of real life. It is an essential
aspect of Aristotle's own methodology that he culled his
ethical, political, and philosophical problems from real life,
that he thought the knowledge really worth pursuing arose
in the first instance from the actual context of human
existence. Such a view of knowledge places central
emphasis on the notion of practical wisdom and creates the
implication that such wisdom is complementary, or
perhaps even continuous, with more abstract learning
conceived on the model of theoria. Thus on an Aristotelian
account, practical wisdom lies at the heart of the
university's enterprise.
If the university is to be a repository for practical
wisdom, it is even more important to realize that it is
perhaps the prime societal institution in which humans will
actually be encouraged to fulfill the development of their
disposition to act from reason according to virtue. Within
the context of the university, students are to have the
opportunity to develop habits of choosing to act with
reason according to virtue, that is, of bringing forth their
latent capacity to effect actions that practical reason
establishes as being at the mean relative to them. They
cannot achieve this general goal if the body of wisdom
available in the university is radically incomplete, because
it does not provide for all of the contexts of human
endeavor in which excellent human functioning is called
for, because it does not include teaching by persons who
have achieved the state of practical wisdom in those
contexts, or because it limits exposure to just those
scholarly works legitimated by the traditional canon.
Practical wisdom is also more easily developed in the
young of a society, when they can identify some of their
teachers and some of their texts with the circumstances of
their own lives. At the moment, we tolerate a state of
affairs in American universities in which a very high
proportion of our students are never exposed to work
written by members of their own gender, race or class. It
was my own experience to go through the course work and
the comprehensive examinations for an entire Ph.D .
program in philosophy without ever once being called
upon to read a work written by a woman. How can the
university be performing its mission in accordance with a
rich theory of the good founded on diverse and excellent
human functioning, when so many aspects of life and so
much practical wisdom is being denied to the very students

whose capacities we are endeavoring to develop? Certainly
we are not preparing them to go out and to live in
accordance with virtue in the myriad contexts within which
they will be called upon to act, so long as the domain of
knowledge available in the university is so restricted.
Finally, all students with the capability ought to be
given the opportunity to develop their capacity to become
true scholars, if we are serious about applying the
distributive implications of Aristotle's conception of the
good to the university. Scholars need recognized outlets for
their work and in order to make that work meaningful and
authentic, they also need to draw on their life experiences
in developing it. The possibility of having one's work
included in the canon cannot be ignored as the logical
extension of one's project as a scholar. By including
women and persons of color in the university community,
as the Aristotelian conception of the good society requires,
we are obliged to accept the real possibility that their work
be included in the curriculum, on pain of inconsistency if
we fail to do so.
I have been particularly interested to apply an
Aristotelian analysis of distributive issues to the university,
because it seems to me to be one institution in society that
is already committed to achieving a rich theory of the
good. This is even more true of a university with a
dedication to the Christian tradition , because of that
tradition's commitment to the moral equality of persons
and the inclusive implications that that commitment
entails. I have intended to make an argument that does
not fall back on intuitive appeals to fairness, powerful
though those might be; rather it has been my desire to
convince you that failing to open up the canon to the
works of diverse scholars involves a failure of the very
enterprise of the university itself. If we take it as our
charge to promote fully human flourishing in the
university environment, if we see it as our role to help
bring forth the myriad human functionings out of the
various human capacities of all of our students, if we place
the development of practical wisdom at the core of our
undertaking, then we cannot present a curriculum to our
students that ignores the many, many rich and varied
contexts out of which such capacities and functioning, such
practical wisdom, spring.O
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"REMEMBER, THIS IS WRITING YOU'RE READING":
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HENRY JAMES, FORM AND CONTENT

Randa

As part of the academic community, and particularly
as a teacher of literature and language, I spend a good deal
of time thinking and talking about the relationship
between texts' form and their content. How does one best
guide students through texts as different-and yet as
similar-as those of Marcel Proust and those of Nathalie
Sarraute? How does one write an effective grant proposal?
How does one convince a student that the way she writes is
as important as what she writes?
I was excited, then, to discover that the form-content
issue is at the heart of Martha Nussbaum's Lave's Knowledge.
What she calls the "project" of this collection of essays is in
fact an exploration of what she sees as the interdependent
relationship between philosophy and literature. A moral
philosopher, she is concerned at bottom with exploring the
question "How should one live?" For Nussbaum, the
search for answers to this question must be wide-ranging,
must be sensitive, must be loving. And importantly, she
sees this search not only expressed in philosophical texts,
but embodied in the forms and structures of novels. She
argues that, precisely because of their nature as narrative,
novels can investigate and express certain fundamental
truths in ways that philosophical writings cannot. Her
proposal is "that we should add the study of certain novels
to the study of [recognized great philosophical works in
ethics], on the grounds that without them we will not have
a fully adequate statement of a powerful ethical
conception" (27).
Narrative fiction constitutes a particularly appropriate
vehicle for the Aristotelian point of view she takes up: her
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exploration of "An Aristotelian Conception of Private and
Public Rationality" argues for making moral choices based
on both the particularity and the context of the situation in
which the decision-maker finds herself. As Nussbaum
expresses it in a recent article in the Times Literary
Supplement, "The whole of character is taken to be
available for ethical cultivation; and human goodness
requires not just obeying certain external rules, but also
forming choice, desire, passion and attention, in a
comprehensive and exacting way over the course of an
entire life" (TLS 10). A novel sets before us people in
situations with choices to make; shows us the results of
those choices; allows us to observe the growth or at least
the changes in characters who must choose their actions
according to new knowledge and changed situations. The
novelist can show us "the course of an entire life," can
create characters who are "forming choice, desire, passion
and attention." We can learn from the lives of characters
who are sincerely seeking moral truth, characters who are
"finely aware and richly responsible," as Henry James puts
it in the preface to The Princess Casamassima.
A central component in Nussbaum's project linking
philosophy and the novel is her desire "to suggest, with
Aristotle, that practical reasoning unaccompanied by
emotion is not sufficient for practical wisdom" (40). Just as
philosophical prose by itself is not sufficient to answer the
question of how to live, she contends, intellectual
calculation cannot alone lead to moral wisdom. Nussbaum
argues that, according to the Aristotelian view, the fact that
emotions are directly connected to some of our most
deeply-held ideas about what is important means that in
some cases those emotions are more trustworthy than
calculated intellectual reasoning. And indeed, in a novel,
not only do the characters feel and often act according to
those feelings, giving the reader a more realistic
representation of life situations in which moral choices are
made, the reader is also emotionally caught up in the
story, with the characters-and thus led by her emotional
involvement to a truer understanding of the moral lesson
to be learned.
Nussbaum carries out her project in part by
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examining the search for moral truth as that search is
represented in works of fiction by Henry James, Marcel
Proust, Samuel Beckett, Charles Dickens and Ann Beattie.
Nussbaum does not argue that any work of fiction can lead
us to a deeper understanding of how to live: "the claim is,"
she says, "that only the style of a certain sort of narrative
artist ... can adequately state certain important truths
about the world . . . " (6). James, in particular, holds
Nussbaum's attention; his works form the object of three of
the essays of Love's Knowledge, and his works of fiction and
his writings on the role of the novelist appear throughout
the collection. If Nussbaum spends much time exploring
the moral dilemmas, the internal debates, the dance of
relationship among the characters of James's work, it is in
part because of the sympathy in their ideas; both hold that,
as Nussbaum puts it, "fine attention and good deliberation
require a highly complex, nuanced perception of, and
emotional response to, the concrete features of one's own
context" (7). But beyond this, there is a particular fit
between theJamesian form and the content, the nature, of
the Aristotelan search that Nussbaum describes. There is
something in James's prose, says Nussbaum, that "unfold[s]
before us the richness of its reflection" (141), that shows
the "bewildering complexity" of moral choice (142), that
"convey[s] the active adventure of the deliberative
intelligence" (142). She describes his prose as
"linguistically fine-tuned" and "metaphorically resourceful"
(157), speaks of the "sheer difficulty of James's later style"
(as exemplified in The Golden Bowl ) , which creates
"consciousness of our own flaws and blind spots" (144). I
would like to explore in more depth how it is that James
constructs a form-a style-that embodies this rich and
sensitive search for moral truth and meaning.

A study of style is more than a list of techniques used
by an author. At its best, stylistic commentary works in
context, showing the inseparability of form and content in
a particular passage or a particular work. Stylistic
commentary should, indeed, itself be "finely aware" as it
helps the reader to a richer understanding of a text. The
study of style that I undertake here builds on Nussbaum's
discussion of The Golden Bowl. The book's focus, of course,
is the relationships among the rich American industrialist
and art collector Adam Verver, his daughter Maggie, and
their respective spouses, Charlotte (a friend of Maggie's)
and the Italian prince Amerigo. In the passage under
consideration here, Maggie has just discovered that her
husband and Charlotte had been lovers before either of
the two was married. Nussbaum's study of the characters'
moral compass--how they judge what is right and wrong,
and therefore how to act-shows that Maggie has always,
heretofore, judged according to rules, logic, intellect: her
moral world has consisted of air-tight compartments that
did not admit flexibility. This "simple" view of the world is
beginning to change, just as the golden bowl with the
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hidden flaw-which Charlotte had considered, but
rejected, as a wedding gift for Maggie and Amerigo-has
been broken. Here, Maggie and Amerigo are alone
together for the first time since Maggie has discovered the
truth about his past. Maggie begins to realize that her
reactions to this complex world of human relationships
must becume more flexible.

Amerigo, meanwhile, after all, could clearly make the most of her
having enjoined on him to wait-suggested it by the positive
pomp of her dealings with the smashed cup; to wait, that is, till
she should pronounce as Mrs. Assingham had promised for her.
This delay, again, certainly tested her presence of mind-though
that strain was not what presently made her speak. Keep her eyes,
for the time, from her husband's as she might, she soon found
herself much more drivingly conscious of the strain on his own
wiL There was even a minute, when her back was turned to him,
during which she knew once more the strangeness of her desire
to spare him, a strangeness that had already, fifty times, brushed
her, in the depth of her trouble, as with the wild wing of some
bird of the air who might blindly have swooped for an instant into
the shaft of a well, darkening there by his momentary flutter the
far-off round of sky. It was extraordinary, this quality in the taste
of her wrong which made her completed sense of it seem rather
to soften than to harden , and it was the more extraordinary the
more she had to recognize it; for what it came to was that, seeing
herself finally sure, knowing everything, having the fact, in all its
abomination, so utterly before her that there was nothing else to
add-what it came to was that, merely by being with him there in
silence, she felt, within her, the sudden split between conviction
and action. They had begun to cease, on the spot, surprisingly, to
be connected; conviction, that is, budged no inch, only planting
its feet the more firmly in the soil-but action began to hover like
some lighter and larger, but easier form, excited by its very power
to keep above ground. It would be free, it would be independent,
it would go in-wouldn't it?-for some prodigious and superior
adventure of its own. What would condemn it, so to speak, to the
responsibility of freedom-this glimmered on Maggie even nowwas the possibility, richer with every lapsing moment, that her
husband would have, on the whole question, a new need of her, a
need which was in fact being born between them in these very
seconds. It struck her truly as so new that he would indeed,
absolutely, by this circumstance, be reaUy needing her for the first
time in their whole connection ... .
(The Golden Bow~ Book Second, Chapter XXXIV)
How does James's style represent, even embody, the
way in which Maggie approaches this new beginning of
moral understanding, and the kind of understanding that
she is learning about, an understanding characterized by
nuance, sensitivity to context, caring for emotion? I would
like to discuss briefly several of the techniques that James
uses in this paragraph, and then show how those
techniques work together to build what is perhaps the
central sentence of the passage, the sentence in which
Maggie feels for the first time the beginnings of change in
her understanding of moral truth.
A listing of the stylistic devices used by James in this
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passage would include the following: repetitiOn of
vocabulary and of syntactic forms; the placement of
elements like adverbs or prepositional phrases in such a
way as to "interrupt" a sentence's syntactic flow; the use of
deictics (words such as "it" or "this," whose meaning resides
in the word or words for which they are standing in) whose
referent appears after the deictic rather than before it; and
the juxtaposition of abstract vocabulary with concrete
vocabulary. An example of each of these techniques in the
passage under consideration will help us to understand
how James is constructing a rich and nuanced context for
Maggie's discovery.
The first instance of repetition occurs in the opening
sentence of the passage: "Amerigo ... could clearly make
the most of her having enjoined on him to wait-suggested
it by the positive pomp ... ; to wait, that is, till she should ..
.. " The repetition serves several functions here. It works
as a sort of syntactic signpost: after the explanatory phrase
"suggested it by the pomp of her dealing with the smashed
cup," which tells us how Amerigo knew she had "told" him
to wait, the reader's attention is brought back to this verb
and then led onward as we discover for what Amerigo is to
wait ("till she should pronounce . . . "). After the
explanatory "digression," we are led back to the point.
Repetition also places extra emphasis on the verb "to wait,"
whose meaning is echoed in the first words of the following
sentence: "This delay." We will see that waiting is in fact
crucial just now for Maggie: she is aware of her husband's
presence and of the change in their relationship that is at
that moment taking place, and she needs time to let the
change unfold in her. Further on in the paragraph James
repeats the word "strangeness": "... the strangeness of her
desire to spare him, a strangeness that had already . ... "
Again, its repetition draws attention to this word; it
underlines Maggie's consciousness that she is reacting in a
way she would not have reacted before: with "a desire to
spare [her husband]." The second occurrence of the word
"strangeness" serves as the springboard for a long and
complex image that equates this "strangeness" with "the
wild wing of some bird" whose flutter darkens the sky for a
moment. Repetition thus makes possible amplification,
giving the reader a richer understanding of Maggie's
feeling of strangeness, and deeper insight into her state of
mind.
One of the most vivid impressions that I have on
reading James is that his sentences are constantly interrupted
by words and phrases that comment, clarify, or qualify in
some way. Often, these "interruptions" are set off by
commas, affecting the sentence's pace and rhythm:
"Amerigo, meanwhile, after all, could clearly make ... "; "to
wait, that is, till ... "; "This delay, again, certainly tested ..
.";"Keep her eyes, for the time, from her husband ... "; "A
strangeness that had already, fifty times, brushed her, in
the depth of her trouble . . . . " The "interruptions"
frequently work on the level of the narrative-the telling of
the story-to guide the reader in some way: "that is" lets
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the reader know that an explanation of sorts is to follow;
"again" points out that in speaking of "delay," the author is
picking up the theme of waiting previously explored.
Thus, the author shows us the relationships between
different parts of the text. Other "interruptions" add
information, as in "A strangeness that had already, fifty
times, brushed her .... " The phrase "fifty times" here tells
us of the pervasiveness of the "strangeness" Maggie feels:
the separation of the auxiliary verb and its past participle
("had ... brushed") by this phrase, with the fact that it is
set it off by commas, breaks up the sentence's rhythm and
highlights the phrase, leading us to see the intensity and
the importance of this new feeling for Maggie. This
frequent "interruption" in James's sentences is a device by
which James weaves a more complete and more complex
textual fabric, allowing us to experience with his characters
the difficulties and the hesitations of life, obliging us to
recognize relationships within the text. As with James's
text, so with life: reading demands, as does the workingthrough of issues of moral truth, careful attention, concern
for qualification and nuance. We cannot plunge straight
ahead through James's text any more than we should
plunge straight ahead through life's moral dilemmas.
This last image-Maggie feeling that the strangeness
of her desire to spare her husband is like a bird darkening
the sky-is an example of the juxtaposition of concrete and
abstract that occurs in this paragraph, and throughout The
Golden Bowl. What Maggie is feeling, the change taking
place in her, her search for moral rightness, exists on an
abstract level; this abstraction is, however, presented by way
of a concrete image ("the wild wing of some bird ... "). In
the same way, in the following sentence, the "split between
conviction and action," the new moral complexity of which
Maggie is becoming aware, is also expressed in concrete
images: conviction "plant[ed] its feet the more firmly in
the soil," while "action began to hover. . . . " The
juxtaposition of concrete and abstract calls on the reader
to imagine conviction with feet, to imagine action as
hovering, helping the reader to understand better, I
believe, the change taking place in Maggie. Encountering
and trying to understand these images, the reader is
involved in "an activity of exploration and unraveling that
uses abilities . . . of emotion and imagination," as
Nussbaum puts it-abilities "rarely tapped by philosophical
texts" (143) but that are necessary here.
All of these techniques-repetition, "interruption,"
and juxtaposition of abstract and concrete-join with the
fourth technique mentioned above-use of deictics-in
what I see as the central sentence of this passage of The
Golden Bowl, in the sentence beginning "It was
extraordinary, this quality in the taste of her wrong .... " It
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is here that Maggie's watertight moral compartments begin
to break apart, just as the golden bowl has broken. From
the beginning of the sentence, James is building tension,
creating a complex and nuanced situation, communicating
to the reader just how crucial this "sudden split between
conviction and action" really is.
The sentence opens with a deictic pronoun: "It was
extraordinary, this .... " Often, the reader knows to what a
deictic is referring, because that thing has already been
mentioned. Further in this passage, for example, is the
phrase "... action began to hover ... , excited by its very
power.... " But here, we must wait to find out the identity
of "it," to discover what is "extraordinary," until the end of
the long clause that follows. "It was extraordinary, ... this
quality in the taste of her wrong which made her
completed sense of it seem rather to soften than to
harden." The opening phrase, "it was extraordinary," is
then repeated and intensified-"it was the more
extraordinary"-as we read of Maggie's having "to
recognize" her feeling.
The same delay in the
identification of a deictic's referent occurs, further in the
sentence, in the phrase "what it came to was that . . . . "
The reader waits to find out just what it came to--in other
words, to find out just what the crucial meaning of this
situation is.
Several things are accomplished by this stylistic
device. First, James is able to highlight the adjective
"extraordinary" by placing it at the end of the short
introductory phrase, and later repeating that phrase.
Second, James creates tension by delaying the
identification of the deictic's reference. This is particularly
true for our second phrase, "what it came to was that . .. . "
James first suspends its completion by adding a phrase that
clarifies for the reader Maggie's state of mind-"seeing
herself finally sure, knowing everything, having the fact, ...
so utterly before her . . . . " Then, after repeating the
phrase "what it came to was that ... , " both to get the
reader back on track and to highlight the importance of
this phrase, James again suspends its completion by putting
in an "interruption "-the phrase "merely by being with
him there in silence." James has thus spun out the
sentence, continually increasing its tension. The release of
that tension comes at last in the important final phrase,
"she felt, within her, the sudden split between conviction
and action." Here, indeed, is the crux of the matter.
Maggie's formerly compartmentalized moral world will no
longer dictate to her what action she must take: conviction
and action have split
Why has it taken James so long to get to this? Partly,
of course, the final phrase has gained in rhetorical strength
through the accumulation of tension throughout such a
long and complex sentence. It is also true, however, that
James has needed to set the stage for this statement: the
reader must understand the full context in which Maggie is
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functioning, to understand the suddenness and the
importance of what she is experiencing. The series of
participial phrases, "seeing ... , " "knowing ... , " "having ..
. , "stresses the certainty of Maggie's knowledge, a certainty
which would, before, have pushed her automatically to a
certain judgment and certain actions. But that is not the
case any more: a final participial phrase, "being with him,"
prefaced by the adverb "merely," contrasts with the
previous group, pointing the way to the change in Maggie's
moral judgment. As Nussbaum points out, Maggie is
learning that she must be like an actress improvising her
role: her responses must be sensitive to situation, must
"rather ... soften than ... harden." She has recognized
for the first time the "responsibility of freedom" that she
has, in choosing how to judge, how to act, how to live.
The sentences that follow build on this image of a
split, and echo the metaphor of a bird in flight, describing
action beginning "to hover, like some lighter and larger,
but easier form, excited by its very power to keep above
ground." Again, James makes this abstract concept clearer
by use of a concrete image. This hovering, this beginning
of flight, also implies a new freedom: "it would be free, it
would be independent, it would go in-wouldn't it?-for
some prodigious and superior adventure of its own." We
note in this sentence yet another "interruption," the
interjection "wouldn't it?" The function of this phrase is
not so much to guide the reader in the text, as other
"interruptions" do, but to allow the reader to follow
Maggie's thinking as she works through these new ideas.
We listen as she reassures herself that the split between
conviction and action really does result in freedom, and,
further, in a "responsibility of freedom." Thus does the
text take us along with Maggie even as her learning takes
place.
Why, then, is James's prose so fitting for this kind of
journey toward moral truth? It makes room for revision or
addition; without being in any way improvised itself, it
facilitates the expression of improvisation, the
incorporation of new knowledge into understanding.
Through repetition and qualification it includes nuance
and refinement of ideas; its complexity defies shallow
attempts at facile understanding. And finally, its rhythms
and tensions enlist our emotions and its images call on our
imagination as aids in comprehension. Thus equipped, we
can follow the characters in their moral adventure,
learning as they learn.
Nussbaum's arguments for the inclusion of texts of
narrative fiction in serious philosophical discussion are
rich, insightful, and, for me, convincing. She is part of the
growing movement of writers in many disciplines who
argue that it is time to move away from the idea that
traditional impersonal expository prose is the only style
acceptable for "serious" academic writing. Such writers
would like academic writing to be open to more sources of
knowledge, including personal experience and emotion
(again, Nussbaum's argument in favor of emotion as a
legitimate source of philosophical knowledge supports
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this), and would like academic writing to be free to dra~
on more kinds ofwritten expression. (I thinkjohn Ruffs
responses, in the form of poems, to our reading and
discussion in the Colloquium are examples of just this kind
of freedom.) It is not surprising, then, to realize that, in
her introduction to Love's Knowledge, Nussbaum writes of
her personal journey toward this philosophical/literary
project. Her intellectual and personal relationships with
novels and with philosophy have much to do with her
belief in this project, and she does not hesitate to include
her own narrative of her growing attention to the ideas that
are explored in this book.
Finally, it is not surprising either to read Nussbaum's
own effort at fusing narrative fiction and philosophical
discussion, in her essay "Love and the Individual:
Romantic Rightness and Platonic Inspiration" (Chapter 13
of Love's Knowledge). Here, she combines "A Story," the
narrative of an unnamed woman reflecting on love and her
own experience of it, with ordered philosophical
reasoning, arguments and counterarguments. The essay's
narrator says, "What I am after, it seems, is a
noncontrolling art of writing that will leave the writer more
receptive to love than before" ( 321). She is trying, also, to
help readers come to an understanding of this topic by
using all of their capacities of understanding-intellectual
and emotional. The reader comes to understand the
question under discussion here both by feeling with the
story's narrator, and by following intellectually the essay's
philosophical arguments. As it expresses the inseparability

of emotional and intellectual knowledge, as it places the
discussion of love in a specific context, the prose style of
this essay is, in many places, distinctly Jamesian-including
complex sentences with repetitions and "interruptions"
that qualifY and give nuance, words that remind the reader
of the text's internal connections, and juxtapositions of
concrete and abstract.
I believe that the growing discussion regarding what
kind of form is appropriate for what kind of content is an
important one, one that we must take seriously, one that
merits more attention than I have paid to it here.
Nussbaum has given us a sensitive and cogent argument in
favor of openness in this regard: in both her
"experimental" essay and her more "traditional" (in form,
at least) philosophical/literary essays, she demonstrates
how much richer and deeper our understanding can be if
we are willing to listen to and learn from different ways of
telling stories. 0
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In Thrley's Woods
The sycamores in Turley's Woods are wet
and give no hint of color that they had
a few days past when looking made you sad
with aching joy, knowing nature let
you find the trees in autumn red and gold
on just this day, or in the amber light
of dusk when oaks and maples shake their bright
slender branches in the blowing cold.
But farms and fields are locked in ice tonight.
The sheep are white and small as puffs of breath
and all the world is cold and still as death
beneath the winter moon whose pale light
uncovers frozen ponds and woods and weaves
the shadows of the clouds upon the leaves.

J. T. Ledbetter
October 1992
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From the Chapel

CHRIST THE KING
Leonard R. Klein

In my sermon two weeks ago I mentioned that one
indication of the problems facing our nation was the loss of
a common moral vocabulary. I said that we were losing a
common language for right and wrong, for good and bad,
and that the tradition of using biblical references as part of
that moral vocabulary was in decline.
Before I left the house that morning I saw in the
Sunday paper a story that many of you also saw and that
one of you discovered had also made The New York Times. It
seems that our District Attorney had had a death sentence
against a convicted murderer overturned in the Supreme
Court of the Commonwealth because he had dared to
quote the Bible in his effort to convince the jurors that
such a sentence was appropriate.
Now there are, I'm sure, a host of technical legal
reasons for the action of the Supreme Court justice. But
it's still an astounding story of the lengths to which we have
gone to preserve our moral vocabulary and our public life
from the taint of religion.
Had the D.A., for instance, quoted Joseph Stalin or,
for that matter, the Buddha, it is unlikely that he would
have lost this appeal. Curiously, the oath administered in
the York County Court that convicted him reads as follows:
"Do you swear by Almighty God, the Searcher of all hearts,
that you will true answers make to all questions asked you
by the court touching the matter now before it-and that
as you shall answer to God at the last great day." If such
language is a problem, I wonder that any convictions
obtained across the alley could withstand the scrutiny of a
higher court! To be sure, that oath is quaint and archaic,

Leonard Klein is senior pastor of Christ Lutheran Church in
York, Pennsylvania, and the husband of historian Christa
Ressmeyer Klein, recently appointed to the Board of Directors of
VU. Pastor Klein delivered an earlier version of this sermon in
November of 1991, but we believe that its importance is
undiminished as Election '92 draws near.
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but is solemn and religious. I've been called to the witness
stand a few times, and, believe me, that oath gets your
attention.
While we should not insist on keeping that oath or on
any of a host of misguided efforts to make our secular state
seem more Christian or just more religious, we ought to be
outraged by the ideas and trends behind the notion that
religion and in particular the majority Christian religion of
America needs to be sealed off from important public
issues. What is disturbing about the reports on the D.A.'s
defeat in Harrisburg is not that a death sentence was
overturned. Christians can have different opinions about
the wisdom of the death penalty. What is disturbing is the
notion that a quote from the Bible automatically tainted
the process. And that it tainted it so severely that the
sentence had to be overturned.
It is important for us Christians in America to
understand some of the thinking behind the developments
that have brought us to this point. We all know that the
First Amendment to the Constitution bars the
establishment of any religion as the faith of this society.
Few thoughtful Christians have ever quarrelled with that
solution to the wide variety of faith and thought in our
country. What is sometimes forgotten is that the First
Amendment in protecting the free exercise of religion
anticipates that religion will play a lively role in shaping the
society. The government is forbidden to establish any
church just so that the varying religious groups will be able
to play their full part in shaping both private and public
life. In spite of their own unorthodox religious views, the
founding fathers were very much of a mind that without
religious backing the morals, laws, rights and freedoms of
the new nation would be on very shaky ground indeed.
As the years have passed, however, Thomas jefferson's
understanding that there should be a high wall of
separation between church and state has gained increasing
prominence. Now for some quarters of our societyincluding many prominent legal thinkers, media gurus,
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and civil libertarians--the wall can never be high enough
or thick enough to protect our rights and traditions from
the dangerous influence of religion.
So, ifwe are going to be faithful disciples and faithful
citizens at the same time, we need to try to figure out what
is going on here and why. We are plainly dealing with
more than an abstract legal theory. We are dealing with
small but powerful elite groups who find the prospect of
religious impact upon our laws, our culture, and our
morals to be an enormous threat. We are confronted by
people who genuinely believe that their liberties, their
values, their very identities are threatened by us. Some are
flat out anti-religious like Ted Turner, who boasts of how
much he has grown since repudiating his Southern Baptist
background.
Most of us do not see ourselves as a threat to the
liberties we enjoy. Nor do we see why a religious idealike, say, thou shalt not kill-embodied in the law is
dangerous simply because it's religious. Yet the Gospel, the
Bible, the Christian Church and its doctrinal and moral
teaching are profoundly threatening to a significant
minority of Americans. Why?
At least in part it is because of the image that
dominates this liturgy for the last Sunday of the Church
year-the assertion that the world has a King. Pilate didn't
want any King of the Jews around, and many our
contemporaries want no such king either.
But the world we are told today has a king. We are
not told that the Church has a King or that the people of
Israel have a king. Or that you or I have a King. The world
has a King.
"The Lord is King; he has put on splendid apparel,"
proclaims the psalm for this day.
The world is ruled. We are not so independent as we
would like to think.
The ruler of this world is not the independent, selfgoverned individual. The ruler of this world is the Lord of
Israel, the Ancient One of our Old Testament Lesson, who
governs through "one like a human being," a son of man.
The world is not defined by our heroic efforts. The
world is defined by the one who, according to our Second
Lesson is "the Alpha and the Omega," whose Son is the
ruler and judge of the world.
That's what we say. If we are to stick by it faithfully,
some people will take offense. They will look upon us as
slightly daffy at best, if not downright dangerous. It is very
possible that those who struggle so furiously against the
influence of religion in public life are taking the Gospel
more seriously than we are.
For, you see, if this world has a king, then you and I
are not kings, not masters and lords of our own destinies.
That assertion is troubling for all human beings. And in
America there is no myth more powerful than the belief in
our absolute freedom and independence. We fought a
revolution against a king and we will have no one over us.
Like all myths this one is a little mushy around the edges.
We follow the British royal family's ups and downs, and
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right here in the city that likes to call itself the first capital
of the American Republic (because the Articles of
Confederation were signed here) this, the oldest of its
churches, fronts on King and George Streets. But the
myth is powerful.
No one shall rule us. Our hearts, our minds, our lives
are our own. Such is the ruling myth of America, and so
our claims for Christ the King and our assertion of the
eternal reign of his Father are threatening and troubling.
The Commandments of God are offensive because
they are, after all, commandments rather than suggestions
or requests. And the notion of a future judgment, even
though it is exercised by the crucified Lover of humanity, is
repellent to those who insist on being their own sole moral
compass.
But if God's Law and judgment are potentially
offensive, so also is the Gospel. For the very word that we
have, Savior, that we have been forgiven, can be heard as
an insult by those who believe that they can and should be
the ones to forgive and save themselves.
We believe that we have heard a good and loving
word from the Eternal God, who comes from outside us to
free us from sin, death, and evil-and from ourselves. But
for those who do not or cannot share this faith, our faith
can be both weird and threatening.
For a world that has declared itself utterly
independent has no use for a King, not even one who rules
from a cross.
We must recognize this. We must be aware that
Christianity does irritate some people. While it may be the
televangelists who get the bad press, don't think for a
minute that we mainstream types cannot also give offense.
We must recognize the very important and exciting
reality that the Church in the United States for all its size,
wealth and prominence is in a missionary situation in a
society that is increasingly ignorant of or hostile to the
good news ofJesus Christ.
We need to know where we stand, and we need to
recognize our own deep sin-that we are also offended by
God's claim over us. It has been said that people go to
church to make their last stand against God. That, I think,
is unfair, but it's still a danger. It's a danger to us and to
our mission in the world that we become so at ease with
our religious life that we forget just how astounding, how
wonderful and how offensive it is to say that the world has
as its King a crucified itinerant rabbi who saw himself as the
means by which God's rule was being initiated.
There are parts of that message that rub us the wrong
way too. We are not always eager either to trust or obey
him. But by the grace of God and the power of his Holy
Spirit, we are able call him our matchless King.
And that is good news. For if this world has no King
and no Judge, it has no future and no hope. If this world
has no Savior, it has no hope of salvation at all. To those
who wish to be liberated from all outside authority and
rule, we can only say that it is good, not bad, to have such a
king. The various liberations and freedoms that people
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think they have achieved will turn out to be tyrants, rulers
and kings of the worst sort. The freedom from God and
neighbor that is so widely celebrated today is nothing but
dreadful slavery- to the self, to the moment, to all sorts of
folly.
But the crucified Messiah does not enslave us. Our
Baptism does not enchain us. The Holy Spirit does not
brainwash us; the Spirit liberates us--to be grateful to God,
to love our neighbors. And what's more God gives us back
ourselves. Our revolt does not free us; it enslaves and
destroys us.
For no feature of our revolt against God is more
conspicuous than this--when we reject God, we reject our
neighbor too and become isolated. Indeed, we imagine
that isolation is good for us. It's only true if it comes from
me. I'm only real and authentic to the degree that I
determine my own course by myself.
But that's not true. You cannot be human alone. I
cannot be myself without you. Nor you without me. Too
many people imagine that human beings are like an onion
and that to get to the real thing you need to keep peeling
back the layers. The only problem with that is that when
you've peeled back all the layers there's nothing left. Take
away your history, your family, your context, your
background, language and morals, and all the
communities and institutions that made you what you are
and you won't find the real you. You'll find nothing at all.
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We are not onions and we are not gods. We are
creatures who have a loving Creator. We were created not
for splendid isolation, for freedom from God and from our
brothers and sisters. We were created for the Kingdom,
the completed and final Community, of God. In the word
of the magnificent eight hundred year old hymn we are
about to sing-we were created for the "social joys" of a
new creation and for the splendid praise of the halls of
Zion, "conjubilant with song."
None of this is to say for even a moment that the
political freedoms and human rights of modern times are
to be discarded. These are gifts of God that give us the
opportunity to express and live in the kind of community
to which he calls the human race. And the misguided
notions of many of our neighbors don't mean that we are
to turn on them with sectarian hatred. We are missionaries
to modern people who have lost their way and sold their
hope for a bundle oflies and false freedoms.
But we have a King. And we should not be afraid to
say so. He has honored us by making us a Kingdom of
priests. In our Baptism we have been anointed to live and
rule with him. We are the ambassadors to this world of a
Kingdom that is not from this world. We anticipate his rule
even now as we praise him. And we await his Holy Spiritin the hope that we might be as excited by the Good News
of his love as are those who feel threatened by it. 0
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I was being plunged from reality."
"And then at the end," I said, "it
was like a hallucination. I was awash in
blue balloons, and red and white ones,
and-"
"Some of them as big as dinosaurs'
testicles," said Moebie. "That was what
popped into my head." "And of
course," she said, "that was close to the
effect intended. The American public
awash in a turbulent sea of sperm,
there in the Astrodome. Symbol of
new birth, fecundity, primal energy, a
virile new attack on all the nation's
people."

Points of Light
Charles Vandersee

Dear Editor:
Moebie had raised precisely the
issue I least wanted to revisit. "Since
you ask," I said to her, "it felt
something like slow suffocation by
toxic fumes."
"As if I was in this big room," I
went on, "and exhaust from a bunch
of big buses kept coming in. My mind
started getting wobbly, and all these
voices ebbed and flowed, foaming with
insincerity. Day after day the voices
got more and more turgid, and various
expressions kept coalescing, and I felt

Charles Vandersee has returned to
Dogwood, Virginia, from Red Cloud,
Colorado Springs, and Little Rock. He
writes regularly for The Cresset, and
lectures most recently on St. Gaudens.
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"Attack on the nation's problems,"
you mean.
I pointed out her
miniblunder, and she nodded
unreddening. Freudian slips are not
what they used to be. I myself had felt
wearied and inattentive, since that last
turbulent Houston midnight. A bad
way to start the new school year. "It
took me a week," I said, "of vigorous
aerobic activity to dissipate some of the
fumes. Newspapers I put aside
unread."
"You didn't really," rejoined
Moebie, knowing all too well my
unanchoritic disposition. "You kept
on reading the pontifications, even the
sidebars and stats, helplessly awash in
the quadrennial tide."
This was an unusual flight of
rhetoric for Moebie, who takes pride
in expressing herself with what used to
be called masculine force. It seemed
the fumes had affected her too. I grew
rigid, suddenly, with the premonition
that she would strike out through the
foamy tide toward the swollen piece of
jetsam called Family Values. I did not
want to join her in clambering over
this jerry-built, tar-coated floating
signifier.
"I suppose," she said, "it was no
better and no worse than the
Democratic convention, since both
parties are past masters of posturing
and pot-calling." Moebie had missed
part of the Houston proceedings, and

all of the New York ones, having been
shuttling between Portsmouth and
Nepenthe, here in Virginia, combining
field work with family feuding. I
myself had missed the Democrats in
New York, trying to prepare unsullied
for vacation.
"This one was better, I'm
convinced," I said. "The cogent
analyses of the dynamics of our inner
cities, with large-scale new initiatives,
presented by Marilyn Quayle and the
Bush grandchildren. The conciliatory
and penitent gestures toward
marginalized people of all kinds, from
the hitherto pugnacious and divisive
Patrick Buchanan."
"I must have missed all that, and
didn't see it reported," said Moebie,
after a long suspicious pause.
I asked what she had been reading,
and she replied with an impressive list
of daily and weekly sources. I
shrugged the conventional male
shrug, the God-given gesture
conveying to women that no matter
how much they find out, men always
have found out one thing more.
This gesture probably would have
provoked Moebie to seething
emotional violence, the female
prerogative, except for the lingering
Astrofumes. "What I think I will
remember for a long time," said
Moebie instead, "was the one moment
that Mr. Bush positively glowed." "As
if," she went on, "he were one of his
own points of light."
I couldn't think what instant she
meant. He had seemed, several times,
on the verge of physical violence, with
a sort of torch behind each eye, that
used to be called feminine, but when
had he been gently luminous rather
than lurid?
"Was it," I inquired, "the deeply
moving moment just after his wife
Barbara, the grandmother of his
grandchildren, told of how her
husband, the President of the Free
World, was never too busy to tell his
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granddaughters of his heroic exploits
in the ocean during World War II,
exploits sacredly reserved only to
men?"

trees and ferns, miniature lizards, a
waterfall, and a century plant much
bigger in prickly diameter than any
dinosaur's testicle."

"There was positively a sea change
in his countenance," Moebie replied,
rejecting this plausible sally. "The sort
of change," she went on, "that a film
director hopes to inspire in every
phlegmatic Grade B actor and seldom
does." "It was of course the moment,"
she said, "(perhaps the climax of the
convention) when he promised the
American public he would vigorously
slash aU their capital gains taxes to pieces."

All this, the Myriad Gardens Crystal
Bridge, was perhaps too candid a
confession, too inadequate a diversion.
Moebie's eyes looked like convention
balloons-restless, vacuous or lethal,
expressions of transience. She takes
very seriously the major media, the
events that give rise to the media, the
aftermath of the media, and the
various bastard offspring of the
media-spaced-out crack children, as
it were--such as C-SPAN.

"He looked," she said, "like a man
struggling to keep his head above
water, who suddenly discovers his feet
touching bottom." "Perhaps," she
mused, incautiously, "Arthurian.
Excaliburesque."
"I must have missed that," I
confessed, feeling slightly disoriented,
as if stumbling over Cod in the middle
of the Pledge of Allegiance. "I was
awash," I explained," in a sea of old
newspapers and magazines, piled up
while on vacation. At the same time I
was lying on the couch succumbing to
the air from the Astrodome, I was
floundering in junk mail."
"Omaha Steaks International was
soliciting," I explained, "also Oglala
Lakota College, also ASH, Action on
Smoking and Health." "None of
which," I rued, "I have ever done
anything for." Moebie's face seemed
alternately ashen and medium rare.

"Also," I admitted, "I was drifting
from time to time back over my travels,
a sort of instinctive coping mechanism
in
periods
of toxiCity
and
watertreading." "My trip took me to
the unexpected," I explained. "A huge
recumbent cylinder in downtown
Oklahoma City," for example, "much
bigger than even the Banzai Pipeline.
At one end a rain forest and at the
other end a desert. You walk up and
down in this cylinder, and lengthwise
across by a bridge, and see towering
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"I can't believe," she said
reproachfully, "that you watched
without undivided attention. You
attended to intrusive mail; you
woolgathered about a garish
Oklahoma spectacle. You probably
even ate."
"I did eat," I reported faithfully,
having plenished the refrigerator
immediately on getting back to town.
"Wonderful local melons," I said, "and
the new cookie-dough ice cream from
Flugen- Scheizs." Is that its name? I
wondered what edibles the Astrodome
hawkers had proffered Buchanan and
Cramm. Certainly not chicken salad.
Perhaps sourdough bread stuffed with
crab?
"Food," I explained, "helps me
concentrate on three or four things at
once." "Food," I expanded, "is
empowering." I groped for an
example.
"Take William Bennett's head," I
proposed. "Which, by the way, I had
never noticed before, is set on his neck
diagonally, or else it was the camera
angle."
Moebie seethed and
murmured; being a media user and
defender, she resents even implied
criticism of technicians.
"On the strength of peppermint
Altoids from Callard & Bowser in York,
England," I explained, "I could read
virtually the whole scenario in William

Bennett's mind. As he kept mouthing
his ever more flatulent insincerities
while nominating Danforth Quayle.
'Plato and Pericles, once,' he was
inwardly intoning. 'Matthew Arn o ld.
Tocqueville. Thomas Stearns Eliot.
Carry Wills, Abraham Lincoln, Edward
Everett Hale, the dead at Gettysburg.'
And of course, every few interminable
moments, 'But what the hell. In
politics, yagottado what yagottadoodoo.'"
"That," I said, "is my cookie-dough
reading of a memorable subliminal
event." "One relishes," I added as a
coda,
"watching
a
would-be
philosopher-king awash in the effort to
breathe timeless universal virtue into a
pirouetting opportunist and moral
marionette."
I could not tell whether Moebie
was now visualizing a cascade of sperm
balloons descending in benison on the
vice-president and against the ample
teeth of his spouse, or whether an
atavistic sensation prompted by
mention of cookie dough had
momentarily pulled her beneath the
surface of the present. She looked
peculiarly drained, as if the reexperiencing of salient low moments
of the recent past had put her in need
of a cold beer commercial.
"A potatoe for your thoughts," I
said.
"I'm thinking," she said, after a
long tuberous pause, "of October." "It
was only, after all," she went on, "a
single event, the convention, in a
sequence of events. It was only a
gathering of the faithful, the
unquizzical, the emergent underdogs,
the party hacks, the figureheads, the
Establishment, the hangers-on, the
manipulators, the mudslingers, the
sleaze craftspeople." "No doubt," she
continued, without taking a breath, as
if afraid to, "the same sort of crowd
that gathered in New York a few weeks
earlier." "Although," she said, "I
suspect the Republicans had more
balloons, though probably they paid
smaller wages to the blowers-up."
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"That would be two differences
between the two parties," I granted.
Moebie as a practiced analyst of public
affairs has a way of getting to one or
more hearts of the matters, sometimes.
It is, after all, not the rhetoric and
posturing that matter, but the
differences between the two parties.
"August is not October," she went
on, sententiously. "And October is not
November."
There was her incisiveness. I am as
appreciative as anyone, when it comes
to a knife cutting through a sea of
foam.
"Anything could happen," I
asserted, striving to meet the pace she
was setting. "Toxicity and turbulence
on the part of both parties could be
replaced by a sort of neo-Perotvian
message to the people that the time
has come for moratoria on greed and
blaming
the
criminal."
Metaphorically, I brushed the water
out of my eye, as both of us dove and
surfaced among the Lone Star swells.
"You mean blaming the victim," she
nearly cackled. What goes around
comes around, as Moses allegedly
heard on Sinai. Moebie craved the
crisp spearmint taste of revenge.
"No, really," I insisted. "I thought
Ross Perot had it in for those of us
who were out blaming the criminal," I
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said. "Didn't he want large rooms full
of
people
conceding
and
compromising, rooms large enough
even for people with the least to
concede, victims even, to make
generous big efforts?" "That is," I said,
"a sort of zero-based entitlement event
in which everybody in the country,
even those with nothing, came
together to confess that they had too
much?"
Moebie had evidently not read the
historical little Texan this way, or had
not had time to, while on the peace
shuttle for and against her feuding
family. I shrugged the male shrug, but
she had averted her eyes.

"Whatever happens in November,
we know what happens after
November," said Moebie, returning
pithily to the subject at hand.
Moebie and I are sometimes very
much on the same wave length, and
we hurled ourselves out of the
turbulent water, metaphorically, giving
each other the high-five: "Business as
usual!"
"A nation as awash or more so," I
added.
I could sense, though, her
immediately wanting to repent of this
shared and triumphalist preNovember, post-Houston cynicism,

which seemed to be able to flourish as
impressively as the tropics in a huge
tube in middle Oklahoma. Think of
all the effort it took in both cities, to
produce the respective results!
I knew that we were far from the
end of our discussion, and I did not
relish the idea of having to induce her
back into a sort of bleak national
depression, now that from the edge of
the pier, metaphorically, she had the
illusion of seeing a point of green
light. It was a surprise, therefore,
when her next comment attempted
closure on an earlier matter left, for
her, pending. For me the pending
issue was the manner of dinosaur
procreation-not mammalian, with
discernible external genitalia, I would
have guessed, but not having volumes
of the National Geographic on disk on
hand.
"Did you get those melons at
Giant," she asked, "or at Food Lion, or
where? Or is it too late?"
"It's almost always too late, for
more and more things," I heard myself
saying, succeeding in not shrugging,
but not by much.
From Dogwood in election year,
faithfully yours,

c.v.
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American Malaise:
Its Diagnosis and
Treatment
Albert R. Trost
The United States is in a period
of malaise. In fact, it is an extended
period, dating at least from the Fall of
1991. This column is certainly not the
first, nor will it be the last place where
attention is called to our national
condition of feeling bad. So many
have commented on the feeling of
malaise, that the comment itself is a
cause of the feeling. The feeling
seems to be associated with the
concurrent decline in the popularity
and the approval rating for President
Bush. It comes after several months of
euphoria over our adventure in the
Gulf. There is no specific scandal or
crisis associated with the beginning of
the bad feeling. However, there is no
lack of symptoms. Major indicators
include the civil disorder in Los
Angeles earlier in the year, the trade
deficit with Japan, the continuing
specter of urban homelessness,

AI Trost teaches in the Department of
Political Science at VU, where his special
interests are comparative government and
Irish affairs. He has been one of the
"Nation" columnists for many years.
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bankruptcies and layoffs, and even
natural disasters like Hurricane
Andrew seem to qualify. With every
symptom, the feeling deepens that
something is wrong.
There is a general feeling that
the "something wrong" has an
economic dimension. There are a lot
of articles written on the decline of
our competitive position in the world.
The feeling here is that the source of
our trouble may be external. There is
also the suggestion by many that the
problems may have a moral root. The
decline of "family values" is a
prominent theme in the present
presidential campaign.
The
suggestion in this theme is that the
causes· are internal. Uncertainty about
America's post-Cold War role in the
world is a third much-discussed cause,
a lack of international moral purpose.
We are like a patient who has
had a low-grade fever for some time; it
has not stopped the patient from
normal functioning, but he does not
feel well. He goes to the doctor for
tests and diagnoses. The doctor finds
ambiguous results from the tests. It is
obvious that the patient is not feeling
well and there may be some faint
suggestions of causes, but nothing
stands out. The patient is told to rest,
change his diet, or take aspirin and go
to bed. The bad feeling persists and
the patient returns to the doctor. The
visit has the same result. There is no
clear diagnosis, and no clear remedy is
prescribed. The condition of feeling

bad persists. After a number of visits
to the doctor with the same results, the
patient is likely to change doctors.
The doctor in this tale is
personified by the President of the
United States. We feel bad and look to
our political leadership to at least tell
us what is wrong, if not also help us to
remedy our condition. We do not
seem to get clear answers. Late last
year, the message seemed to be that
nothing was really wrong, but the bad
feeling came from a bunch of "naysayers" positioning themselves for the
presidential race. Early this year, the
President and his spokespersons
seemed to strongly agree that our
problems were economic and had
external causes. He went off to East
Asia to fix the causes and blame (and
got sick himself in Japan). Lately we
have heard more about moral
dimensions to the malaise, and the
suggestion that a renewed emphasis on
family values under Republican
leadership was the remedy. There is
not much evidence at this writing that
the President has been vindicated as
diagnostician, doctor, or political
leader of the nation. We seem about
ready to change doctors.
At this point, the writer of this
column is also ready to make the
change. Like much of the rest of the
public, it is not so much because the
other candidate, Bill Clinton, is
believed to have the correct diagnosis,
or the quick remedy. It is more the
feeling that we are not making much
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progress towards feeling better with
the one we have. Parenthetically, our
dilemma in finding the right doctor
might explain the fascination of some
for the appeal of that purveyor of
snake remedies, Ross Perot.
Before many of us rush off to
change physicians, one more look at
the malaise and the political
leadership of George Bush might be in
order.
It would grossly overstate the case
to say that the United States has lost its
competitive edge in international
economics. We have lost the edge in
some product areas like automobiles
and consumer electronics, but are
front-runners in computer software,
biotechnology, aerospace and
pharmaceuticals. We continue to
experience negative trade balances,
though the value and the volume of
our manufacturing exports continues
to rise. The productivity of American
labor remains relatively high and the
cost relatively low, so that neither
factor has been responsible for a
decline in our competitive position.
The United States remains a strong
and successful economy. However,
even though we are the largest
national economy, others have been
growing faster. We are not the leader
in all categories. In some, like
investment in our own manufacturing
sector, we are well down the list.
It is when the comparative
perspective is dropped, and the only
comparison that is made is with
ourselves, that the feeling of malaise
grows. We are in a recession (though
others are as well). Real growth in our
economy under President Bush,
computed as an annual average, is
only about a third of what it was under
Presidents Carter and Reagan.
Government budget deficits continue
to grow to record levels, the last two
years of the Bush administration
being
particularly
bad.
Unemployment has grown in the Bush
years. It has gone from over 5 percent
to well over 7 percent. Newspaper
articles continue to report that more
are hungry and more are homeless
than at any time since the Second
World War. A newspaper article in
October 1992

our local paper this very evening
reports the number of "hungry" in
America at 30 million.
It is hard to blame Mr. Bush
alone for the recession, trade deficits,
or budget deficits. He has had to
share decision-making in these areas
with a Congress, both of whose houses
have been controlled by Democrats for
the last four years. Also, most of the
rest of the industrialized world is also
experiencing recession. However, as
The Economist, a British publication
observed in its January 18, 1992 issue,
in America, "to an extent that is not
true of any other country, they look to
the President for a lead; first in
honestly admitting that the country
has hard work ahead of it, and then in
suggesting what that work might be."
The Economist concludes in that same
article, "giving a lead is not Mr. Bush's
style."
It is not only in the economic
maladies where diagnosis, prescription
and cure are desperately needed. The
health and education systems are in
dire need of attention. Neither can be
fixed simply by more money. This is
especially true of the already too costly
health-care system. Structural reforms
are required. Innovation is required.
Leadership is needed.
Perhaps the biggest reason for
our present malaise is the one most in
need of basic identification and
diagnosis. It is at its base a moral
problem. This is the continuing
inequity of life conditions among our
own people. We are a strong and
successful nation, but a sizable
minority do not share in this strength
or success. Across the family income
spectrum, there continue to be vast
differences in nutrition, housing,
health care, and basic education. We
need, as a nation, to be shown this
problem, and reminded of our
responsibilities for it. Cure of these
maladies, especially this last, is too
much to ask of one President's time in
office.
Can President Bush help us with
our feeling of malaise in a second
term? The evidence from his first
term and his other public positions
earlier in his career are not

encouraging.
President Bush's
strengths are his prudence, and his
ability to consult with others and to
compromise. He works best in a small
group. His style was what was needed
in molding an allied coalition to fight
in the Gulf (and to win). His
accomplishments in guiding Western
response to the demise of the Soviet
Union (among Western leaders), may
be his chief claim to later fame. He
has been patient and prudent in
bringing Israelis and Arabs together in
the Middle East (through James
Baker). He is good at mastering
complexity, but not in communicating
the complexity to the American
people. His analysis of a complex
domestic problem sounds like waffling
and indecision.
The warmth,
compassion, and cordiality he has
been able to convey to leaders of other
allied nations with whom he works,
with his close staff and friends, or even
occasionally with Congressional
leaders, he has not been able to
transfer to the American public at
large.
We might be able to ride with a
warm, close family doctor and friend
for four more years, but George Bush
has not been the country family doctor
that maybe his predecessor was to
many people. He does not inspire that
kind of trust. Impatient with our lack
of confidence and trust in him, he has
occasionally pandered to our baser
instincts and self-diagnoses. His ill
advised trip to Japan with our auto
industry executives in January was such
a time. He was on the verge of "Japanbashing." The use of Willie Horton to
talk about crime and social problems
in 1988 was not inspiring. He has
recently resurrected his "no new taxes"
prescription again.
Our doctor has been prudent,
even conservative, and probably
competent as he has tried to deal with
our problems over the last four years.
But he has not diagnosed or cured our
general malaise. It may be too deep
and too complex to be cured.
However, many are tired of feeling
listless and down. We will probably try
another doctor. 0
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The Player :
A Postmodern Morality
Play
Reinhold Dooley
In a recent press conference
Woody Allen defended himself against
charges of child molestation, and thus
implicitly defended the morality of his
affair with Mia Farrow's adopted
daughter, the child for whom Allen
acted as father figure for 12 years.
Framed by the TV screen, this event
played like an out-take of Manhattan.
It had the "real life" texture of Zelig. It
also displayed the metaphysical
confusion of Purple Rose of Cairo, in
which a fictional character steps out
from the film into the real world. As in
earlier days when Reagan blurred the
line between Hollywood and reality,
Allen appeared more like a fictional,
cinematic character, than a real
person.
In this bizarre episode we see a
blurring of the lines between the
"actual" historical real and the
cinematic real and a concomitant
blurring of distinctions between the
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moral and immoral. This blurring is
symptomatic of postmodernism, which
erases distinctions by undermining all
absolutes and foundations.
Specifically, postmodernism
rejects the linguistic theology which
assumes a referent or "real" existing
prior to language. "There is nothing
outside the text," states Jacques
Derrida, by which he means, among
other things, that there is no world or
reality which we can talk about which
is not itself a text. There is nothing
beyond or behind language. Rather
than directing us to the real, language
is tropic; it only takes us to more
language. It keeps us at the surface
level of meaning because there are no
depths of meaning to plumb; there is
nothing below language. Linguistically
speaking, this means there is no
foundational meaning to language,
only the radical plurality and play of
unresolvable indeterminacies. In
theological terms there is no
grounding author or authority who
underwrites the real or who gives
authenticity to identity and validity to
morality.
It is within this context of
postmodern theory that Robert
Altman's latest film, The Player offers
itself up as a morality play for our
times. In a variation of Derrida, The
Player suggests that "there is nothing
outside the film." It suggests
(somewhat exaggeratedly, of course)
that in American culture of which
Hollywood is a microcosm, there is no

reality beyond the cinematic, beyond
the surface of film. There is no reality
which is not interfused with the
qualities and values of what I shall call
the "cinematic reel." (Note: For the
sake of brevity I conflate all mediaTV, advertising, movies-under the
rubric of the "cinematic reel.")
The Allen incident is a
particularly blatant example of how
utterly interfused and imbricated
American culture IS with the
cinematic. It is necessarily a more
subtle interweaving of spectacle and
reality that we find in the general
population. But it is not my purpose to
document instances of this cultural
phenomenon beyond its manifestation
in Altman's film. (See the work of jean
Baudrillard who has shown how the
media has constructed western
cultural reality by replacing it with an
imaginary hyperreality.)
Altman's movie is typical of the
thriller genre in that it involves
murder
and
suspense.
But,
significantly, the murdered person in
this instance is an author of
screenplays and his murderer is a
Hollywood executive who suspects the
writer of sending anonymous
threatening postcards. And atypical of
the genre, the executive, Griffin Mill,
actually gets away with cold-blooded
murder.
Furthermore,
in
a
quintessential "happy ending," he gets
the dead writer's girl as well.
The movie is set in Hollywood ,
the epitome of the cinematic reel. As
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such it crystallizes the theoretical point
that "there is nothing outside the
film": the Hollywood which the film is
supposed to represent is itself already
film-like. There is a redundancy in
making a film about Hollywood
because it is always already all show
and showpeople. An expose of the
"real Hollywood" would reveal only
tinsel behind the tinsel of Tinseltown.
At one point Mill pleads, "Can't we
talk about something other than
Hollywood?" But he immediately
breaks into resigned laughter: for
these Hollywood insiders there is
nothing outside of Hollywood. The
ever-conspicuous motto of Mill's
studio reads, "Movies, now more than
ever."
Even for those outside the
business, the Hollywood simulacrum
supersedes the real. When Mill is
taken in as a murder suspect, a witness
notes with amazement that her real-life
experience of the police lineup is just
like 1V. It is only the similarity to the
mediated version of reality which
makes the event real to her. Her
experience of reality has been
constructed by the cinematic reel.
The difficulty of establishing
what is truly outside the film, is
suggested by the desire to use "real"
people in the movies. When pitching
his script to Mill, a British screenwriter
insists on casting "real" people in his
film Habeas Corpus. His overzealous
agent surreptitiously interjects the
name "Bruce Willis" for the lead role.
The distinction between the real and
reel fails here. The screenwriter 's
"real" people are actors, after all; while
Bruce Willis, though an actor, is
nonetheless "real."
Even the cameo appearances
which seem to point outward toward a
grounding reality are problematic.
After seeing cameos of at least 60 stars,
we are taken aback when we initially
encounter Whoopi Goldberg holding
an Oscar in her hand. We mistake her
for herself when in "actuality" she is a
police officer interrogating Mill. The
cameo itself as a device leads us to
question what it means to act as
oneself, to play oneself. When Bruce
Willis finally appears in the Hollywood
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production of "Habeas Corpus," there
is some difficulty in "producing the
body"; for his appearance is a cameo
of himself playing himself as his
persona playing a character in a
movie. As Altman's title suggests, in
the real and the cinematic reel,
everyone is a player.
Of course, no one is more of a
player in this movie than Griffin Mill.
Figuratively, he is a player in the
Hollywood game of power and
prestige. Throughout the film he plays
his social role scrupulously: he dresses
the part, drives the proper car, drinks
the appropriate designer waters from
correct glassware. As the movie
progresses he very convincingly acts
the part of an innocent man. However,
he is also a player in a literal sense in
that he is an actor in a film. In the
opening shot of The Player, as credits
roll, we view a scene marker which
states "Scene 1, take 10." The film is
actually a movie within a movie. At the
conclusion we discover that Mill has
produced a movie called The Player,
the very movie we have just watched.
His life has been grist for his own
Hollywood mill. He is a player in both
the real and the reel. This is
recognized at least twice in the film.
Imitating a player from the movie
Freaks, one of the police challenges
Mill's real status, taunting him with the
chant "one of us, one of us." Kahane
too identifies Mill as an unreal player,
stating, "See you in the next reel."
Postmodern life, The Player
reveals, is cinematic. Like the actual
strip of film, it is all surface,
transparent, depthless, capable of
projecting life-like but nonetheless
insubstantial images. Rather than
being a convenient vehicle for the
expression of the real, film, it turns
out, is itself the real, and the only real
there is. Nothing authentic underlies
film or exists beyond film. In the
postmodern world real people are
actually players; real things are only
simulacra, mere representations of an
imaginary real.
In postmodern terms, The Player
establishes that the universe we live in
is emphatically not "logocentric."
Derrida describes logocentrism as the

Western metaphysics which professes
an ultimate referent, a self-certifying
absolute foundation beyond the play
of language which is able to fix
determinate meanings. Historically,
God has been acknowledged as the
Logos, the fixed center and the
guarantor of the validity of language.
The postmodern condition
results from a loss of God as the
author of the word and the world. In a
linguistic echo of Nietzsche, it declares
what Roland Barthes calls the "death
of the author." Without the author as
arbiter of a text's meaning (or the
world's), we are left with a neverending proliferation of discrepant
meanings. We are left with radical
undecidability as all readings become
defensible. It is precisely this
postmodern phenomenon, the death
of the author and its resulting anarchy,
that is enacted in Altman's morality
play.
The desire for independence
from the author is expressed by Larry
Levy, a studio executive vying for Mill's
position. He argues that screenwriters
are too expensive, he questions their
creative ability, and suggests that their
originality is undesirable. He
denounces them as ultimately
superfluous. To his rhetorical question
"Who wrote the ending of Fatal
Attraction?" he answers "the audience."
Using an apt religious trope, he rejects
authors, stating "I never saw a writer
who could change water to wine."
Mill, of course, has actually
enacted this desire for autonomy by
murdering the screenwriter, Kahane.
Pursuing Levy's unwitting association
of the author with THE Author-God,
we discover that Mill is a diminutive
version of Lucifer. Thus, within the
theological and theoretical allegory of
this morality play Mill has nullified the
diadic economy of origins/originality,
author /authority, creator I creativity.
He has figuratively initiated the
postrnodern age.
Furthermore, like the vulturous
griffin whose name he bears, he preys
on the dead, usurping the murdered
writer's lover, June. In an act of
Freudian rebellion, he reenacts the
oedipal event, killing the authoritarian
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father and seducing the mother. As a
result of these violations he is loosed
from the law of the father, from
author and authority. Both he and
June become their own points of
origin, radically free to create their
own world, and to interpret their own
morality. Mill rightly describes June,
and himself by extension, as a
"pragmatic anarchist."
They
rationalize that "If you don't suffer,
then it wasn't a crime." And Mill
suffers neither remorse (both he and
June are described as heartless) nor at
the hands of the law, because he gets
away with the murder. In the absence
of the Author as
external,
transcendent arbiter of morality, there
is no need for moral discernment. In
this film, distinctions are made
between designer waters rather than
crimes and misdemeanors.

The final scene depicts a smiling
Mill hugging his pregnant wife amidst
a profusion of flowers, in front of their
mansion, with an American flag
blowing in the breeze. Is it the
American dream come true? Is it a
happy ending? Or is it meant to be
ironic? In the absence of an author it
is difficult to tell. But this is a morality
play I have asserted. And in fact The
Player resurrects both the author and
moral authority. The author actually
never died. As it turns out, Mill
murdered the wrong writer. The actual
writer of poison pen letters ultimately
returns to bl_a ckmail Mill. The demand
is that he produce the movie which the
blackmailer calls The Player.
But this is not the true return of
the author, for the blackmailer's
power is tentative and does not dismay
Mill in the least, and rather than
condemn the "happy" ending, it

ensures it. Rather, the authentic
author has been with us the entire
film. It is Altman himself. He is the
grounding author, the moral
authority, who announces himself in
the opening shot of the film and is an
abiding and critical presence
throughout. Altman, who is literally
introduced in the credits, preserves
the leader footage with the scene
marker in it and thus blatantly asserts
his very real authorial and
authoritative presence behind the
camera and throughout the film. It is
thus his movie which frames Mill's and
serves as a stinging comment and
rebuke of Mill, Hollywood, and
postmodernism. And it is Altman, not
Mill, who gets the last laugh. Dubbed
over the picture-perfect ending and
undercutting its "happiness," we hear
the ironic and scornful jeer: na-nee nanee nah-nah. 0
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Gandhi Pizza
We tried to live your ideas, there in Iowa,
nonviolence in the corn,
tried to nourish the vision of a Pella ashram
tried to find the simple, essential life
in Happy Joe's.
You were Ben Kingsley on the screen,
a warm feeling of peace and understanding
to us, in a land of simple ideas,
stubborn stances, fixed vision,
traditional values.
How can you spin cotton in a small town,
how can you go about in a loin cloth,
we wondered,
how can you extract salt
from a freshwater reservoir,
what's oppression
where few hold contrary thoughts?
Brutal shots rang out
in six-channel Dolby.
We ordered a medium pepperom,
a medium taco pizza,
talked about ignorance destroying humanity,
considered fasting to open minds,
imagined our bodies prone before horses,
stayed out past midnight
on endless diet coke refills.
Gandhi-not-medium
you sample, example,
of the East
on that Mid-western screen.
Mid-mediocrity, bad taste in our mouths,
we became as perplexed as you,
the long quiet car ride,
the good night, good night,
the see-you-before-the-dishwasher-tomorrow,
the lonely fall towards sleep,
the why of the streetlight bleeding in the night,
sending slivers of where across my sheets.

Stu Selthun

October 1992
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Faith in Many Keys

Jean Sulivan. Morni"f/5 Light: The
Spiritual Journal ofJean Sulivan. Trans.
by Joseph - Cunneen and Patrick
Gormally. New York: Paulist Press,
1988. 180 pp. $12.95.
The Sea Remains. Trans. by
Robert A. Donahue, Jr. and Joseph
Cunneen. New York: Crossroad, 1989.
118 pp. $13.95.
Last fall, my class and I were
discussing Mark's story of the rich man
who followed all the commandments:
"Jesus, looking at him, loved him and
said, 'You lack one thing; go sell what
you own, and give the money to the
poor, and you will have treasure in
heaven; then come follow me.' When
he heard this, he was shocked and
went away grieving, for he had many
possessions" (10:21-22). What might
this mean to thirteen middle-class
freshmen and their middle-class
teacher? Well, some of us said, it
doesn't mean we have to sell what we
own. We just need to keep ourselves
from getting too materialistic, and
keep the poor in mind. One student,
who spoke infrequently, offering
something either drolly humorous or
deeply serious, disagreed. "Too often
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people water down these words. I
think he means just what he's saying.
The challenge he's presenting is real,
and spoken to us, too." His conviction
impressed and unsettled us. By
affirming Jesus' harsh request that we
give away everything and follow, the
student reanimated the moment in
Judea, and its radical challenge.
Jean Sulivan also attempts to
reanimate the harsh-and joyfulwords of the Gospel. A French
Catholic priest, born in 1913 and
killed in an au to accident in 1980,
Sulivan lived out his vocation in his
writing. His work can be located in a
tradition that includes Charles Peguy,
Georges Bernanos, and Simone Weil,
each of whom Sulivan cites. Highly
regarded in France, most of his twentysix books are published by the
prestigious Gallimard press. As I call
attention to Sulivan 's prestige,
however, I run counter to the spirit of
his voice. In both of his recently
translated, mutually illuminating
books-his novel, The Sea Remains, and
his spiritual journal, Morning LightSulivan sees prestige and power as
squelching the Gospel's radically
humble Word: "Jesus' message is the
opposite of power" (ML 25). In his
embrace of "the humility of the flesh"
(ML 97), in the homely Semitic
images with which he invests his words,
Jesus affirms the value of our physical
lives, and the paradoxical authority of
kenosis, the pouring out of power.
The Gospel's words call us to
participate in the process of kenosis in
our own lives, and its call can shock,

wound, and grieve. Ultimately it can
liberate and heal. Sulivan 's own
words seek to usher in the possibility
of such an experience in his readers.
In the first section of Morning
Light, Sulivan offers deeply felt and
insightful readings of Mark and John.
He insists that if we truly wish to hear
the Gospel's Word, we must release
the Greek conceptual and Roman
legalistic traditions surrounding it, and
embrace its Semitic rootedness: "The
Gospel emerged from a world of
peasants and sailors. Jesus is the rabbi
whose word is transpierced with
images of trees, water, harvests, cattle,
shepherds, and vagabonds" (ML 3).
In allowing concepts to eclipse the
Gospel's physical, prosaic vitality, we
run counter to its message of humility;
our impulse to conceptualize easily
turns sectarian and imperialistic (ML
90). To avoid such an impulse,
Sulivan exhorts us to read and
experience the Gospel as a poem, for
"in every poem the revelation is not
situated only, or primarily in the idea;
it is not a knowledge. It is born of a
breathing and rhythm-that is, it is
conveyed by the body, and not only in
the mind" (ML 4). In response to this
revelation, we evince our faith and
love in our bodies-in our tone of
voice, our glances, our gestures toward
others, perhaps in "quietly doing the
dishes," the image with which Sulivan
closes Morning Light ( 180).
Sulivan 's spiritual wisdom is
grounded in the Incarnation and
kenosis of Jesus. He thus recognizes
the Church's need for institutional
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embodiment. As a character in The Sea
Remains puts it, "the gospel couldn't be
delivered to the world in its pure
essence. If the soul were without a
body, there would no longer be a soul"
(24). Yet a tension can emerge
between Incarnation and kenosis. If
the Church inhibits the working of the
Spirit through its body of dogma, or
confuses spectacle with enspirited
ritual, it allows power to abolish
kenosis, and embodiment becomes
petrification. The Church can easily
forget its fun dam en tal role as the
"servant of the Gospel" (ML 27). As
servant, it ought to "allow the Word to
make its own way within human
consciousness" ( ML 92). If in the
quest for conceptual coherence, it
attempts "to keep the lid on that
sparrow-hawk, the Holy Spirit" it
"yield[s] to the temptation of an
imperialistic unity" (93). Likewise, if it
covers itself too snugly with the
trappings of power and prestige, it
grows deaf to the Gospel's call to
poverty. Cardinal Ramon Rimaz, the
chief character of The Sea Remains,
reflects on this in a homily:
Of course he remained convinced
that the Church needed a firm and
independent base in order not to dissolve
in people's consciousness: there were lots
of examples to demonstrate the illusion of
those who had wanted to rely solely on
their inspiration. But little by little, he
said, he had come to think that the social
power of the Church could be the cause of
its spiritual weakness, just as a mass
membership could go hand in hand with
profound alienation. The Church itself
ought to be poor and humble, without
waiting to be crucified. People were able
to be poor and humble for themselves, and
rich and proud for the Church. (100)
Rimaz utters these words-"as
discreet as a feather brushing a
windowpane"- late in the novel, near
the end of an interior journey through
humiliation and self-discovery. He is a
retired Spanish cardinal, living in a
villa near the sea. In an Augustinian
search through memory, he recollects
those moments when the conflict
between his role as Church leader and
servant of the Gospel was most clearly
cast into relief. He remembers his
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mother stepping into "the immense
panelled rooms of [his] episcopal
palace," and asking, stunned, "'How
can it be? We were . . . and you,
because you . .. Is this what the gospel.
. . ?'" (44).
He recalls the
authoritative challenge of a young
Chinese priest: "'Juan Ramon, are you
a successor of the apostles or the
director of a corporation?'" (56).
Now, with "all real power. . .
withdrawn" (9), he recognizes the
futilitad of a life founded on external
reverence and regard as opposed to an
interior vitality.
In anger and
humiliation,
he
orders
his
housekeeper to burn - "Quema"the ecclesiastical memorabilia she has
lovingly gathered.
Here, at his lowest point, his
interior journey takes a hopeful,
restorative turn. On long walks along
the shore, he attends closely to the
physical reality surrounding himwater, beach grass, boulders, the faces
and bodies of other people. As he
enters into relationship with an
unlikely array of others-a small child,
a painter and her imprisoned lover,
his niece and her Marxist boyfriend, a
poor fisherman-he emerges from
solitude. Gradually, he rediscovers his
deepest self and his vocation: "To his
endless amazement, by discovering the
world
he
entered
in to
the
understanding of the gospel" (81).
Like the Gospels, which are his
inspiration, Sulivan's work is rich in
paradox. In The Sea Remains, Rimaz
must lose his self before he finds
himself; in his recovery of childhood
he achieves maturity; in accepting the
limit of death he discovers his greatest
joy. In Morning Light, Sulivan avows
his Gospel-rooted preference for the
marginal and the powerless, the last
that shall be first-the rebel, reject,
and vagabond. But, in his journal, as
he pokes at the pompous and
powerful, he veers close to sarcasm
and judgment. Here paradox can
deteriorate into binary opposition, and
become just another assertion of
power: "There is no hope for someone
like that," he writes of the person who
tells others "he's praying, that he's
been praying, or is about to pray."
Immediately aware of his objectifying

self-assertion, however, Sulivan seeks
paradox and humility in his next
sentence: "Of course, he might be a
saint; language is deceptive" (138).
In
The Sea Remains, he
relinquishes such power in his refusal
to inscribe its plot with a clear-cut
authorial preference. The character
one least suspects, emerges, possibly,
as most Christ-like: Juan Gonzalez, a
traditionally pious, rich, right-wing
landowner. In a remarkable sceneone which looks ahead to the recent
film Jesus of Montreal-the powerful
landowner plays the part of Christ in
the town's version of the Passion Play.
"[P]erhaps ... he becomes, by grace,
humble and poor, one with Him
under this cross" (113). "[P]erhaps"
(104) too he inspires the culminating
kenotic step of Cardinal Rimaz. As
novelist, Sulivan sustains the radically
disruptive spirit of paradox.
Appropriately, Denise Levertov
has described Sulivan 's novel
"polyphonic," a word that the Russian
literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin uses
to describe Dostoevsky's affirmation of
"the indepen~dence, internal freedom,
unfinalizability, and indeterminacy of
the hero. For the author the hero is
not 'he' and not 'I' but a fully valid
'thou' ... " (63). Bakhtin's words can
be applied to Sulivan. In each of his
characters, including Gonzalez,
Sulivan deeply respects "the mystery of
conscience and ambiguity of human
actions" (SR, 69). He relinquishes
authorial omniscience and control
over them. His authorial "perhaps"
regarding their motivations suggests a
position alongside rather than above
them. Thus, polyphonic creation
partakes in kenosis.
Sulivan 's fractured style further
evinces his relinquishing of tight
authorial control. Although ultimately
beautiful in form, The Sea Remains
often proceeds by hints, ellipses,
premomtwns, and fragmentary
images. Although themes recur in
Morning Light, and the book is rich in
challenging ideas, he refrains from
imposing a restrictive coherence or
"order" (85) upon them. Taking the
path of Eckhart, Siesius, the Tao, the
Tch'an, he resists what he calls "the
dominant thought of the West, which
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invites us to knowledge, to power, to
take, to possess" (11). In neither work
does Sulivan wish us to mentally
manipulate a system of ideas. He
invites us, in this instant, to joyfully
embody the words he offers: "Truths
for our feet I Truths that can dance"
(113).

As a Catholic, I believe that
Sulivan's words can be salutary to the
Church today, particularly as it
responds to the questions of authority
and ecumenism. Here is Sulivan on
authority: "The prophet versus the
worldly leader. We need a form of
authority-author, one who gives life
(the author of my days), who increases
it-a chief if you prefer, but without
power" (ML 162). I think here of
Archbishop Weakland of Milwaukee,
relinquishing his position above, to sit
with and listen to the women whose
voices had not been heard. Such
authority "authors" in that it opens up
a space for the voice of the other,
allows it to be heard, and seeks
decision through attentive dialogue.
Might such a conception of authority
be institutionalized?
As a Catholic teaching at a
Lutheran university, I am struck by the
radical similarities in our two
traditions, and wonder when we will be
"officially" united. Sulivan also speaks
briefly about ecumenism:
The Church exists everywhere there
are communities that give testimony of
universal love. Unless language changesand it changes only after a spiritual
revolution---ecumenism will remain what it
has seemed so far, an administrative
enterprise, following the laws of
competition in which,
despite
the
vocabulary of good feeling, we always
detect the prudent search for advantage.
We don't want to be cynical, but the truth
is that no one wants to lose his clientele.
Ecumenism will become truly worldwide
only by rejecting calculation, through selfeffacemenL (15(}.57)
For Sulivan, both a revisioning of
authority and the success of
ecumenism will require a kenosis, a
relinquishing of power and the selfeffacement of all involved.
The path to self-effacement is
painful; the habit of self-assertion dies
hard. Sulivan is a reliable, challenging
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guide on the interior journey that can
lead to such a death-and to the
rebirth of one's deepest self, "where
decisions are made" (ML, 25). He aims
to strip us of our too-habitual
assumptions and assertions of piety:
"May this book leave you broken and
dispossessed" (ML, 84). But the scene
of dispossession might be that of
plenitude. Sulivan 's words-like
those of some students-seek to open
a place for a new, more radical
reception of the Word, and the
inspiration that can follow. For the
attentive reader, they succeed in
fostering "the creative liberty of men
and women wounded by the Gospel"
(ML, 6).
Paul J. Contino

Mark Kline Taylor. Remembering
Esperanza: A Cultural-Political Theology
for North American Praxis. Maryknoll,
New York: Orbis Books, 1990. $29.95
(cloth), $16.95 (paper).
The burden of this book is to
reflect critically upon Christian
theology and its "postmodern" cultural
and political situation.
Taylor
characterizes this situation as
"trilemmic" such that each of three
concerns threatens to displace the
others: to acknowledge tradition, to
celebrate cultural plurality, and to
resist political domination. How can
we celebrate plurality without falling
into a toothless relativism which
dissolves tradition and the moral basis
of resistance to domination? How can
we affirm Western tradition without
denying the legitimacy of "nonWestern" traditions? How can we
resist domination without rejecting
tradition and plurality?
These
questions are especially relevant for
college and university communities as
they reexamine their curricula and
aims in light of recent challenges to
the hegemony of European, Western
traditions in higher education. The
pointed and perceptive way in which
Taylor puts his finger on our
postmodern problem is one of the

achievements of his book.
Taylor offers no simple formula
for solving these vexing conflicts, but
his aim is to theorize in ways that take
them seriously. The general direction
of his "way out" of the trilemma is to
privilege the need to resist oppression
when this conflicts with tradition or
cultural plurality. The final aim of
resisting oppression is to affirm and
celebrate differences. Taylor enrolls
tradition, and specifically Christian
theology, in the project of resisting
oppression and affirming cultural
plurality. He focuses upon four major
forms
of oppression-sexism,
heterosexism, classism, and racismdeveloping his analyses in ways
attentive to their bearing upon
plurality.
Though he sees important
differences among these forms of
oppression, Taylor argues that the
unifying source of oppression resides
in fear of "otherness" and the related
need to control that which threatens
people in power. He begins with
sexism, not because it is the root of all
other oppressions, but because it is
more ubiquitous and more accessible
to himself as a white, male, affluent,
heterosexual, Princeton Seminary
professor.
Taylor argues that
patriarchy is motivated and sustained
by a matriphobic and matricidal
mythos. In making his case, he draws
from anthropology, mythology, and
psychoanalytic feminist theory.
Greek, Babylonian, and Hebrew
mythic traditions, argues Taylor, have
as a pervasive feature the defeat and
control of "mother-identified" powers.
Perhaps the clearest example here is
the Babylonian creation epic, in which
the male hero, Marduk, attacks and
dismembers the female, Tiamat
(representing the primordial matrix of
existence), and creates the cosmos out
of her carcass. Males, threatened by
differences between themselves and
their mothers, diminish, control, or
destroy women. According to Taylor,
this basic theme is also dominant in
the Hebrew Bible and Greek
traditions. Add to this a general
diminution of women's cultural and
economic powers to oppress women,
and the outcome is sexism. The fear
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of otherness, and related need to
control, is also a central feature to
Taylor's analysis of other forms of
oppression:
The abstracting from the mother. .. not
only involves the continual subordinating
of women to men ... (sexism); it also
involves the alienation of women and men
from intimate friendship with their own
gender and from being at home with their
own bodies (hetero-realism), the
alienation of women and men from just
distribution of the earth's goods (classism),
and,
further,
the
systematic
dismemberment of black men and
women's bodies and lives (racism)
(147).

Taylor denies that matricide is
the single cause of all oppression;
more than other books with similar
concerns, this one resists simplistic,
monocausal
explanations
of
oppression (and of anything else).
These are inseparable, interlocked
modes of oppression. But he does
claim that matricide is the heuristic
key in that it provides a deep and
perverse dynamic unifying varied
forms of oppression in ways which
other candidates do not
Although this unifying center
makes for extremely provocative
analysis, it also gives rise to objections.
Why should sexism be the mode of
oppression which unifies the other
three modes?
The astonishing
prevalence and severity of absolute
poverty arguably makes classism a
more basic form of oppression than
sexism, and call for political and
economic analyses rather than the
anthropological and psychological
analyses that Taylor seems to favor.
Taylor's sense that, at bottom, all
oppression is a failure to deal with
"otherness" fits the central role he
gives to sexism, but his clear ranking
of the need to resist oppression over
the need to celebrate plurality would
seem to favor classism as heuristically
primary when treating interlocking
oppressions. Why give any one of the
four modes of oppression heuristic
primacy? Racism would seem to be
more central than sexism for
interpreting the multiple forms of
oppression plaguing Native American
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communities.
Even if one agrees that sexism is
heuristically primary as the unifying
dynamic of oppression, one might
argue with his claim that matricide is
the basic dynamic of sexism. His
support for the claim that the
matricidal tenor of the Babylonian
creation epic is also found in Genesis
is tenuous at best. Though it is
plausible to say that Genesis expresses
a clear subordination of women to
men, it is stretching the evidence to
say that Genesis locates the roots of
this subordination in matricidal or
matriphobic impulses. Taylor is well
aware of other explanations of the
deep roots of sexism. Perhaps it is his
own longstanding interest in
anthropology and religious mythos
that leads him to see the matricidal
origins of sexism more clearly than,
say, economic or political ones.
Interestingly, emancipation from
political oppression
is more
fundamental than the celebration of
plurality for Taylor's view of Jesus
Christ. The priority here is more
strategic than absolute; Taylor tends to
see Christian theology as "strategic" in
the sense that the central normative
concern is how to get a theology that
supports liberation from oppression
and affirmation of difference. A
central problem for Taylor is that the
Christian "mythos" (Christianity's
narratives and communal practices)
has often served to exacerbate rather
than to alleviate sexism, heterosexism,
racism, and classism. He confesses
that Christian scriptures are
"androcentric, patriarchal, at other
points racist and anti-Semitic, too"
(162). For him the problem is much
deeper than misusing the Bible.
Therefore he expresses sympathy with
those who reject Christianity, saying
that they are making an "authentic
and appropriate" response.
Although Taylor respects those
who make this "authentic" response,
he chooses instead to remain
Christian. He does so because there
are
examples
of
Christian
communities that resist oppression
and because Christianity offers vital
resources which might be marshalled

in the cause of justice and freedom.
The heart of his revised Christianity is
the claim that "Jesus Christ" refers
primarily to a social and historical
dynamic emancipating the oppressed
and reconciling cultural differences.
People experience Jesus Christ, th n,
when they are participate in pro· cts of
liberation from sexism, hete
racism, and classism.
The root metaphor Taylor
proposes to guide a revised
understanding of Jesus Christ
identified above is "Christ us Mater."
"Christ our Mother," says Taylor, holds
more power to liberate us from the
matricidal impulses beneath all
oppression than do other images of
Christ. "Christus Mater is a root
metaphor, then for a general
maternalization of hmpan community
and nature that is emancipatory for
women in struggle against sexism, but
also for a maternalization that includes
the materialization of all creation's
hopes for emancipation from that
which enchains it, pollutes it, destroys
it" (196). Taylor is aware of objections
to his proposals-from the side of
Christian theology and of feminist
theory-but he advances them
nonetheless, though with clarification
and qualifications.
Taylor's efforts to revise
traditional understandings of Christ in
light of our trilemmic situation are
instructive in many ways. Too many
theologians are blind to the ways their
claims perpetuate injury to others, or
simply are irrelevant to today's
pressing problems. But the blatant
way .Taylor submits theology to
projects of liberation, and to specific
interpretations of these projects, is
troubling. He is intensely aware of
difficulties surrounding traditional
sources of authority for theology.
Thus he declares, "All exegesis is, in
fact, eisegesis, but there remains a need
to display the traits of the texts
themselves that are consonant with
one's interpretation" (182). For him,
the Bible and traditional Church
teachings provide a vast and diverse
theological smorgasbord. Since
theological and moral content of these
sources is malleable and almost

31

endlessly multivalent, selection and
reconstruction are to be determined
primarily by the interests of the
interpreter rather than by the Biblical
text or by a combination of text and
the confessional heritage of the
Church.
I wish Taylor were as suspicious of
his own interpretation of the sources of
oppression as he is of traditional sources
of theological authority.
The
multivalence of our social and cultural
situation is as diverse as, if not more
diverse than, that of the Bible. Some of
the more radical theorists of
oppression-those whose rage distorts
reality with reductionistic analyses--are
capaciously tolerated, perhaps because
of Taylor's guilt feelings stemming from
his membership in the class of white,
affluent, heterosexual males. His
focus upon sexism and matricide as
the heurisitic center for understanding
our situation leads to illuminating
analyses of both our situation and the
Christian tradition, but it fails to do
justice to elements of Christian faith
which might challenge this analysis.
"Christ Our Mother" as a root
metaphor for Jesus •Christ, for
example, is a very provdcative way to
think about Christ. But if this is the
root metaphor, then what happens to
Christ, sent by the Father and
empowered by the Spirit to free the
world from sin and evil and to renew
the face of the earth? What happens
to the theocentric themes in the Bible
and tradition themes which,
without blinding us to or hardening us
against the suffering of this world,
relativize the world and its projects
and practices?
We are in Taylor's debt for
writing such a clear analysis of
profound problems; any careful reader
will benefit from the helpful ways he
poses issues, makes his choices, and
supports them. His passion for justice
and compassion with those who suffer
is inspiring. Social theorists wishing to
explore the relevance of their
disciplines to a thoughtful Christian
practice will find this book stimulating.
Those who cavalierly dismiss all
liberation theorists as reductionistic or
mutually contradictory will find here
an important challenge. But Taylor's
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systematic, intentional subordination
of scripture and Church to projects of
liberation is, ironically, in danger of
cutting Christians off from the very
sources of grace and truth that
empower them to resist oppression
and affirm difference.
Douglas]. Schuurman

Alison Leslie Gold. Clairvoyant: A Novel
of the Imagined Life of Lucia Joyce. New
York: Hyperion, 1992. Pp. 176.
$ 19.99.
The life and times of James Joyce
merited the meticulous care of an
EHmann. Joyce's contribution to
Western literature could not have
been fully appreciated, moreover,
without the careful work of a host of
scholars who have enriched our
reading of the giant by their careful
comments. But there comes a point
when scholarship can be lethal.
Paddy Kavanagh, one oflreland's
most famous poet laureates, once
asked, "Who killed James Joyce?" His
answer, of course, was that academics
had. The first weapon used "to slay
mighty Ulysses" was a Harvard thesis.
Further blows were inflicted by essays
that gained American students
scholarships at Trinity College.
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Hundreds of conferences and
thousands of articles later, the Joyce
industry has more than amply
demonstrated Kavanagh's point.
There is only so much that can be
written about any author-even a
magnificent one like Joyce-before
the author can fall victim to critical
cannibalism, his vitality sapped, his life
blood drained by a descent into trivia.
Any new book aboutJoyce comes into
print with a rebuttable presumption
that it is unnecessary. Alison Leslie
Gold (co-author of the story of Miep
Gies, the woman who helped the
family of Anne Frank to hide from the
Nazis in Amsterdam) has overcome
this presumption and added
something of value in her first novel.
If there is any lacuna in the
scholarship about James Joyce, it is
probably with respect to his daughter
Lucia, who was clinically diagnosed as
a schizophrenic (among other things)
and who was confined to various
mental institutions in France,
Switzerland and England for nearly
half a century until she died alone in a
geriatric ward in Northampton near
the end of 1982. ln1935 Lucia-then
28-was hospitalized in a clinic outside
of Paris. She saw her beloved father
on Sunday visits, when he would
repeatedly reassure her that she would
get well (as close as he ever came to
acknowledging that she was sick), but
she was never reunited with him
before he died suddenly in 1941. Her
mother Nora did not visit her in the
asylum and never saw her after the
War. The solicitors for her father's
estate refused her repeated requests
for funds to travel to see her brother
Giorgio, with whom she had one visit
in 1967. At her own request Lucia was
buried not in Zurich beside her
parents and brother, but in a quiet
spot in England under the shade of a
chestnut tree. The biographers note
that the roar of the great lion at the
Zurich zoo can be heard night and day
near the Joyce grave in Fluntern
Cemetery. They imagine this powerful
voice celebrates the greatness of the
father. Gold's Lucia knows better: it is
her absence from that grave-the
"empty hole in the ground "-that
evokes the lion's roar.
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Lucia's long and lonely isolation
from her family did not inhibit the
Joyce scholars, including EHmann,
from calling on her to learn any details
about her father she might supply.
Before the appearance of this work,
however, few, if any, found Lucia Joyce
interesting in her own right. Gold
treats Lucia as a subject of fiction, not
an object of biography, or-worse
yet-of pity. She has empowered the
female voice of one not normally
acknowledged as one of James Joyce's
women.
In constructing her novel, Gold
has relied on EHmann's masterful
work and on the other contributions
of leading Joyce scholars. She does
not join their fascination with turning
up new bits of information about the
Joyce family. To her credit, Gold has
taken care to respect the private and
personal lives of her subjects. As she
states in an afterword: "No use has
been made of medical records nor of
intimate letters that invade family
privacy." At one level Gold's work has
the strength of an historical novel.
Never far from her story are the major
events and the chief figures in the life
of the Joyces. Far more significantly,
though, Gold has created an image of
the complicated inner life of her
protagonist.
Lucia's imagined autobiography
unfolds at intervals spaced in decades
from her twenties to her seventies.
Appropriately, the memory of the past
is scrambled. The story begins at
Lucia's fortieth year, then cuts back to
an ingenious sketch of her childhood
and adolescence cast in the form of
notes for an opera set in Trieste,
Zurich, and Paris, and featuring Lucia
as the Soprano, Papa as the Tenor,
and Marna as the Mezzo-soprano. The
chapter "At Fifty" flashes forward to
the condition of a sedated patient
whose lessened violence and increased
lucidity is ascribed to the newly
discovered antipsychotic drug
Thorazine. The long-term effects of
this medication are described in the
following chapter "At Sixty."
In a lovely spoof on Joycean
scholars, Gold has a middle-aged
professor named Carr (one thinks of
the bureaucrat in the British consulate
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in Zurich whom Lucia's litigious father
sued for libel, and whom Torn
Stoppard transforms into the central
figure of Travesties) turning up at
Lucia's asylum armed with a letter
from the solicitors for her father's
estate permitting a series of interviews.
Lucia remembers him all right, "but
not with pleasure." Carr obtains
Lucia's brief essay, "The War," and
reads it to a Joyce Symposium in
Cologne in 1970, despite the delicious
irony that Lucia reports that her father
refused refuge from the Nazis in
England "because he called the
English a reptile-like race ending with
Mr Carr, a true snake who turned and
spat at us after fifteen years a friend."
As "Joyce scholarship was
growing more lively with each passing
year," Lucia's newly discovered essayactually a copy rewritten by Lucia's
nurse-fetches a high price paid by
the oil-rich University of Texas
outbidding libraries in London and
Prague. Lucia notes both that her
essay "was of little use to Joyce
scholarship" and that it formed the
basis for eight Ph.D. theses. Lucia the
septuagenarian is "too tired and fed
up with the past" to help the Joyce
scholars and biographers any more.
Finding the experience of dealing with
the never-ending army of the curious
to be "heart-pilfering," Lucia has an ad
run in the newspaper asking the Joyce
scholars not to bother her any more.
The two central and lengthiest
chapters, "At Twenty" and "At Thirty,"
contain Lucia's memoirs, dubbed
"The Story of the Blotting-Paper Girl
(Keep Them Guessing for 300 Years)."
The world depression is in the Parisian
air. More than an economic fact,
depression is a psychological reality
among the characters that crowd into
Lucia's life. There are hard times not
only for the Joyces, but also for their
friends, Samuel Beckett and Ezra
Pound. Lucia "wept
much more than Mother had wept."
Ellrnann describes the daily visits of
Beckett to the Joyce household as
exchanges of silence; the fictional
Lucia recalls the degrees of intensity of
these eerie silences: 'from wistful to
dirge-like.' But she also remembers
Beckett courting and spurning her;

hers too is the memory of the faithful
Beckett who kept in touch with her
during the war and sent her a birthday
present every year until she died. The
biographers uniformly describe
Lucia's love affairs as sad; by contrast
the fictional Lucia's coming of age was
passionate and intense.
In Zurich Lucia consults as a
patient with Carl Gustav Jung. She
recalls her father's characterization of
Jung as "a Swiss Tweed led urn" and
Freud as "the Viennese Tweedledee,"
but she does not share this memory
with Dr. Jung. Nor does she reveal her
recurrent dream that Europe would
soon be criss-crossed by hobnail boots,
"for fear that giving voice to this secret
information would ... actually cause it to
occur." For all her father's conviction
that "what might be construed as
incomprehensible nonsense to others
were flashes of imagination and
wisdom," after repeated suicide
attempts Lucia finds that all of her
doors and windows "now contained
locks."
Weekly contacts between Lucia
and her father are recalled tenderly,
even nostalgically.
Despite the
omnipresenc~ of a hefty nurse, "Father
and I played the piano together each
Sunday, sang together, ate Italian
cakes together."
Through the
daughter's eyes we glimpse an intense
portrait of the artist as an old man
after the completion of Ulysses:
"immobile on a bench on a quiet
street of Paris ... , every muscle and
sinew gone slack ... , seeing nothing
through his useless eyes but dancing
specks of white light in the left and the
pale mauve shadow of two trees with
his right."
Like
Stoppard 's
brilliant
inversion of Hamlet, in which the tale
of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern is as
plausible as that of slain royalty, Gold's
Clairoayanl makes Lucia Joyce come to
life as vividly as many of the characters
of The Dubliners, if not those of
Bloomsday itself.
If Kavanagh was right in warning
that scholars could "slay mighty
Ulysses" with their dissertations, we
can be grateful that Gold has not
added to the trivia Joyceana, but has
produced a moving piece of fiction in
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the Joycean mode. It is a more fitting
tribute to Lucia than her father's
insistence that his daughter was not
sick, but clairvoyant (which gives rise to
the title). As the fictional Lucia puts it:
"He looked for messages in my flights
of thought in conversation,
in my distractions." It is Gold who has
found those messages and given us in
this novel of Lucia's imagined life the
sort of work in which Joyce himself
would have taken more delight than in
dozens of the efforts by critics to
unravel his own work.
Edward McGlynn Gaffney

Masao Takenaka and Ron O'Grady.
The Bible Through Asian Eyes. New York:
Friendship Press, 1991. pp. 200.
$35.00 (cloth), $25.00 (paper).
This is a splendidly conceived
and beautifully produced volume. The
authors deserve much of the credit in
selecting the more than 100 works
from eighteen countries in Asia, for
they are respectively chair and vicechairpersons of the Asian Christian Art
Association which is behind this
venture. Neither of the authors is an
artist or professor of art, but each has
had a long-standing interest in
Christian art in Asia and has played an
important role in promoting it. Dr.
Takenaka is professor of Christian
ethics at Doshisha Univeristy in Japan
whereas Ron O'Grady is a minister of
the Associated Churches of Christ in
New Zealand and former Associate
General Secretary of the Christian
Conference of Asia.
Takenaka
published the first collection of similar
works, Christian Art in Asia, in 1975,
and this led to the formation of the
Asian Christian Art Association.
The ecumenical, international
scope of this venture is remarkable.
Friendship Press is only the distributor
(in the USA). The actual publisher is
Pace Publishing in New Zealand, and
the printing was done in Hong Kong.
Support for this volume came from
Protestant and Roman Catholic
missionary societies in Canada,
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Germany, the Netherlands, and
Sweden-and from the Suntory
Foundation in Japan.
The format of this volume is
attractive and illuminating. Facing the
artistic works, which are in full color, is
a page of text which consists of a brief
explanation of the artist and his or her
medium and technique, a relevant
scripture passage, followed by an
appropriate reflection or meditation
either by some well-known Asian writer
or by the authors of this book. The
visual and verbal contributions
compliment each other nicely, but
either would stand by itself as a thing
of beauty.
I am not an artist, nor an artist's
son (to paraphrase Amos), although I
acted as an interpreter for a number of
contemporary print artists during our
last years as missionaries in Japan.
Hence, I am not qualified to make
critical judgements about the quality of
the
artistic
contributions.
Nevertheless, I venture that most of
these works would more than pass
muster by any artistic criteria. The
overall impression is one of strength
and vitality. The genre vary from folk
art, wood carvings and traditional oils,
acrylics and prints, to flower
arrangements on concrete blocks, laser
art, and bronze wall sculptures.
A few pictures are reminiscent of
older American Sunday school cards,
but for the most part they avoid the
maudlin, cloying Christian art seen too
often in this country. Some are stark
in their realism, others striking
abstractions which convey something
of the opresson and suffering
experienced by many Christians in
Asia.
My only reservation is with an
occasional eclectic comment in the
text. I question, for example, the
assertion of Jyoti Saki, an Indian artist
and theologian:
It appears to me that a Buddhist, Hindu,
Moslem or even an agnostic can represent
Jesus as an authentic expression of his or
her belief. That is, the image of Jesus can
represent a true confession of faith for
believing Hindu, Buddhist or Moslem.

To say that Jesus can have a
universal appeal for people of all faiths
or no faith is one thing. To say,
however, that "the image of Jesus can
represent a true confession of faith for a
believing Hindu, Buddhist or Moslem"
is something else (my italics). The
understanding of guilt, grace, and
redemption varies so much in the
different faiths that it does not do
justice to any one of them to suggest
that the Christ of the Christian faith
can be confessed faithfully by a Hindu
or a Muslim.
Despite this demurral, I can
recommend the book with great
enthusiasm. It is not only a feast for
the eyes and a stimulus for the heart
and mind; it also deepens one's faith
and gives fresh new understanding of
familiar Biblical scenes. As the authors
point out, "Asian eyes may indeed have
a unique way of viewing reality which
will help [us] to see familiar things in a
new perspective." To savor this book is
both a religious and an aesthetic
experience.
I. John Hesselink
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Two Poems

Sylvia

by
I don't know why
but you are wearing a hat,
a hat you would never wear
in your dream .

Daniel J. Langton

There is a gate
a young man would vault,
I would open
or watch it opened
or stand before.
Of course there are birds
sending signals called song
as we stand there,
the gate getting smaller,
the day dying down.

Flesh Wound
Your letter rumples the window seat,
pleated as carelessly as the dress
you wore to Paris in another time,
when today was all there was, we had no past
and didn't know the future tense. You asked
for nothing, not even a question, sublime
in yourself, the world a rueful mess
you hadn't caused, love a religious retreat.
Now you write: What can we do if the centers
aren 't holding, the edges are as dead
as skin about to fall, the things that mattered
are broken, bruised, smashed and scattered?
I remember that woman, and what she said:
The healing begins as the bullet enters.

October 1992
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